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ABSTRACT 
The collapse of the communist regime in 1990 and the establishment of political 
pluralism marked the beginning of a new era for Albania, one of transition from 
communism to democracy. In addition to undertaking domestic political and economic 
reforms, Albania began to establish political and economic relations with European and 
Euro-Atlantic organizations as a means of making the transition to democracy 
irreversible. Membership in these organizations, including the Organization for Security 
and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 
and the European Union (EU), was a long-term objective of Albania’s new political 
leadership.  
This thesis examines their important roles in helping the country to democratize, 
carry out democratic reforms, and meet membership criteria. It also analyzes their impact 
in shaping the country’s domestic political development, and their role in the promotion 
of stability, security and prosperity. It concludes that the involvement of these 
organizations has enhanced not only the quality of the reforms, but also the sustainability 
of democratic achievements in Albania. 
Finally, the thesis considers the prospects for Albania’s future democratic 
development, the OSCE’s probable future role in the country, challenges beyond NATO 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
The collapse of the communist regime in 1990 and the establishment of political 
pluralism marked the beginning of a new era for Albania. These events started a 
democratization agenda involving state rebuilding processes aimed at restoring not only 
the boundaries between politics and economics, but also the boundaries separating public 
from private, the state from civil society, and the regime from the state.  
The end of 1990 also marks the beginning of a transition period from communism 
to democracy. In addition to domestic, political and economic reforms, Albania started to 
establish political and economic relations with Western countries and international 
institutions and organizations. The last country in Eastern Europe to put an end to its 
communist regime, and with no previous democratic experience, Albania sought 
cooperation with international organizations as a means of making the transition to 
democracy and a market economy irreversible. Furthermore, membership in international 
organizations, including the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(OSCE), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the European Union (EU), 
was a long-term objective of Albania’s new political leadership. 
This thesis addresses the important roles of the OSCE, NATO and the EU in the 
transition of Albania by helping the country to democratize, carry out the necessary 
democratic reforms, and meet membership criteria. The major research question is how 
and to what extent these international organizations, the OSCE, NATO and the EU, have 
affected the democratization process in Albania. The thesis analyzes the influence of 
these international organizations on the process of democratization in Albania, their 
impact in shaping the country’s domestic political development, and their role in the 
promotion of stability, security and prosperity. 
B. IMPORTANCE 
Many experts have written about democratic progress in Albania, but little 
assessment has been given to the impact and leverage of international organizations on 
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the development of democracy in Albania. The legacy of the communist regime made it 
difficult for Albania to cope with the demands of international organizations.  Almost 
twenty years after the end of the communist regime in 1990, Albania has entered a new 
phase of political consolidation and democratic development. The country has made 
considerable progress towards strengthening democratic institutions. Albania became a 
member of the OSCE in 1992 and a member of NATO in 2009. Achieving membership 
in NATO was the most important foreign-policy event in post-communist Albania, and 
the most significant democratic milestone for the country.  
It appears that international organizations such as the OSCE, NATO and the EU 
have helped accelerate the democratization of the country. The process of negotiations 
with the European Union, which officially started on 31 January 2003, was finalized with 
the signing of the Stabilization and Association Agreement between the Republic of 
Albania and the European Communities on 12 June 2006. In April 2009, Albania applied 
for “candidate status” with the European Union.  
The goal of this thesis is to assess the impact of the OSCE, NATO and the EU on 
Albania’s democratization process. It investigates the hypothesis that the involvement of 
these organizations has helped, not only in the quality of reforms, but also in the stability 
and sustainability of democratic achievements in Albania. The thesis does not disregard, 
however, the contributions of domestic actors in the democratic development of the 
country. The thesis also considers the prospects for future democratic development, the 
OSCE’s future role in Albania, challenges beyond NATO membership, and most 
importantly, further reforms to be accomplished in light of the prospective EU 
membership. 
C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESIS 
The OSCE, NATO and EU membership processes are evaluated with a view to 
determining to what extent they have been successful instruments in the promotion of 
democracy in post-communist Albania. The OSCE was the first international 
organization that Albania joined in 1992, shortly after the collapse of the communist 
regime. Since then, cooperation with the OSCE and other international organizations, 
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particularly NATO (through the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, Partnership for 
Peace and Membership Action Plan), and later the EU, provided the blueprints for 
reforms and prepared the country for membership.  
The effects of the international assistance in the democratization process appear to 
have been significant because Albania is one of the countries that, according to Dessie 
Zagorcheva, lacked “the technical expertise to design the democratic institutions they 
desire.”1 In contrast with the OSCE, NATO and the EU use conditionality as a promising 
strategy in promoting democracy and establishing democratic institutions in Albania and 
other countries. Like other East European countries, Albania chose first to focus “on 
satisfying NATO’s less rigorous membership criteria”2 as a means of paving the way 
towards EU membership.  
As noted previously, in April 2009, Albania became a member of NATO and 
applied for “candidate status” with the European Union. The parliamentary elections held 
shortly thereafter were considered a good chance for Albania to leave the past behind and 
to confirm the progress and strengthening of its democracy. With this political 
background, the thesis, in addition to analyzing the extent to which the OSCE, NATO 
and the EU affected the democratization process in Albania, raises three important issues: 
first, the quality and standard of democratic reforms in the country;3 second, challenges 
beyond NATO membership; and third, prospects for EU membership. 
As Emilian Kavalski has observed, “Alliance socialisation,” including 
democratization, “does not end with membership, but carries on inside the organisation as 
well.”4 While membership in the Alliance is the conclusion of a long relationship, 
integration into the Alliance is a much longer process, which in addition to the 
development of national capabilities in the political, economic, military, financial, legal 
                                                 
1 Dessie Zagorcheva, “Correspondence:  NATO and Democracy,” International Security 26, no. 3, 
(2002): 221–235.  
2 Zoltan Barany, “NATO’s Peaceful Advance,” Journal of Democracy 15, no. 1(2002): 63.  
3 In other words, was NATO membership made possible because of the democratic reforms carried 
out, or was NATO membership an unmerited “gift” to the Albanian people and its political class?  
4 Emilian Kavalski, Extending the European Security Community Constructing Peace in the Balkans 
(Touris Academic Studies, London, New York, 2008), 163.  
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and information security areas, requires the continuation of democratic reforms and the 
strengthening of democratic institutions. Only the completion of these reforms and the 
strengthening of democratic institutions will bring the date of EU membership closer for 
Albania. Democratization is a continuous process, and as such, it never ends. 
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Literature on the promotion of democracy has grown considerably during recent 
years, and it increasingly recognizes the importance of the changed international 
environment, since 1990, in providing new opportunities for the promotion of democracy. 
Among the themes highlighted in the recent literature are the priorities of the promotion 
of democracy among foreign policy concerns, the growing acceptance of the idea of 
international involvement in the internal affairs of states, the proliferation of instruments 
for this purpose, and the predominant focus on outcomes as well as processes.  
The recent literature illustrates an increasing trend in examining the role of 
international organizations as promoters of democracy and stability. While not all 
international organizations regard the promotion of democracy as part of their mission, 
membership in organizations composed of democratic countries positively affects 
democracy’s promotion. With regard to democratization and other goals, conditionality 
“is the core strategy of international organizations to induce non-member states to 
comply with their fundamental rules of statehood.”5  
The role of the organizations under consideration in this thesis has borne 
significant importance for Albania, with a legacy of almost 45 years of complete isolation 
and the harshest communist regime in Europe. International actors played an important 
role in the regime change in late 1990.  
The new political situation in Europe, especially with the enlargement of NATO 
and the EU, has raised the issue of the relevance of the OSCE to the new security reality 
in Europe. Since its inception, the OSCE has always been instrumental in “the 
                                                 
5 Frank Schimmelfennig, Stefan Engert, Heiko Knobel, “The Conditions of Conditionality,” 
http://www.essex.ac.uk/ECPR/events/jointsessions/paperarchive/turin/ws4/Schimmelfennig.pdf  (accessed 
01 August 2009).  
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transformation of Europe from the Cold War to the post-Cold War era.”6 The OSCE has 
reflected the changing needs of participating states as well as the ongoing transformation 
of European and international affairs. 
Another significant body of literature has recently focused on the role of the 
OSCE in security and democracy promotion. Two schools of thought have developed. 
One school, while confirming the contribution of the OSCE “to the transformation of 
Europe from the Cold War to the post-Cold War era,”7 argues that the radically changed 
contemporary European security landscape has affected the organization to such an 
extent that it may be called an organization “in crisis and decline.”8  With the new 
international security landscape, there are other international institutions—the EU, the 
Council of Europe, and NATO—which address the same issues but from different angles 
or perspectives, and “have all more or less successfully adapted to the new international 
political and security landscape.”9 At the same time, with the successful enlargement of 
the EU and NATO, “there is a tendency at the political level to devote less attention to 
the OSCE which has increasingly disappeared from public view. In many countries, the 
OSCE is rarely placed high on political agendas in Capitals.”10  
A second school of thought, while admitting the current critical situation of the 
OSCE, holds that “the OSCE still has the potential and has a relevant role to play in a 
Europe facing new security challenges. In recent years, the OSCE has encountered 
serious problems and has entered into a critical situation that requires high-level attention 
by the participating States.”11 Furthermore, “the OSCE institutions should be restructured 
to reflect today’s challenges from the emerging new security architecture of Europe.”12 
                                                 
6 Paul Dunay, “The OSCE in Crisis,” Chaillot Paper no. 88 (2006): 89.  
7 Ibid., 89.  
8 Ibid., 7.  
9 Ibid., 16.  
10 “The Future of the OSCE” A Joint Project of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly and the Swiss 
Institute for World Affairs, Washington, 5–6 June 2005, 
http://www.osce.org/documents/pa/2005/06/15378_en.pdf 6 (accessed 18 June 2009). 
11 Ibid., 5.  
12 Robert Berry, “The future of the OSCE,” British American Security Council, 2003/1, 11, 
http://www.basicint.org/pubs/futureosce-fin.pdf (accessed 19 June 2009. 
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However, both schools of thought maintain that the organization is in need of reform and 
that the OSCE needs, at the moment, “a new spirit of Helsinki.”13 
The post-Cold War enlargements of NATO have raised the debate of whether the 
Alliance contributed to democratization in Europe. Since the end of the Cold War, NATO 
membership has been a consistent political objective for East European countries, “a 
prospect that has given NATO tremendous leverage over these states’ domestic and 
foreign policies.”14 As with the OSCE, two schools of thought have developed. One 
school of thought, while stating that “NATO membership has not and will not advance 
democratization in Europe,”15 backs that argument with the enlargements that took place 
during the Cold War, focusing on the cases of Greece, Portugal, Spain and Turkey. Those 
authors do not consider, however, that the political and strategic security circumstances 
that led the Alliance to include those four countries were significantly different from 
those after the Cold War, the end of which allowed the Alliance to consider giving 
“practical content to its long standing vision of a peaceful political order in Europe.”16 
The fact that these countries, with the exception of Turkey, are currently members of the 
European Union, suggests that NATO has contributed to their development and 
increasing democratic strength.17 
As for the post Cold War enlargements, particularly the inclusion of the Czech 
Republic, Hungary, and Poland, one school of thought holds that NATO membership did 
not speed the democratization process, “because their societies and their elites were 
committed to democracy anyway. History reveals that these states had made long strides 
toward democracy even before the NATO carrot was dangled before them.”18 The other 
                                                 
13 Ilkka Kanerva, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Finland,  
http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav021408b.shtml (accessed 18 June 2009. 
14  Zoltan Barany, “NATO’s Peaceful Advance,” Journal of Democracy 15, no. 1(2002): 63. 
15 Dan Reiter, “Why NATO Enlargement Does not Spread Democracy,” International Security 14, no. 
4 (2001): 42. 
16 David S. Yost, “The New NATO and Collective Security,” Survival 40, no. 2 (1998): 35. 
17 Greece became a member of the EU on 1 January 1981, while Portugal and Spain did so on 1 
January 1986. 
18 Dan Reiter, “Why NATO Enlargement Does not Spread Democracy,” International Security 14, no. 
4 (2001): 64. 
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school of thought, which is the prevailing one, strongly supports the idea that NATO has 
fostered democracy development in Eastern European countries. More than 20 years 
since the collapse of communism, there is no doubt that, today, Eastern Europe is more 
democratic than at any time in its history, and in that regard, “NATO enlargement has 
been a major element of Europe’s democratic consolidation.”19 Since the early 1990s, it 
has been widely agreed that increasingly “shared liberal democratic values and norms are 
at the heart of NATO’s legitimacy.”20 Moreover, the Alliance dedicates significant 
attention to democratization and defines security as closely linked to democracy. The 
common Atlantic democratic values, as described by the authors of the Washington 
Treaty in 1949, “are as constant today as they were when the alliance was created.”21 
The post-Cold War rounds of NATO enlargement and the Alliance’s security 
documents and practices “expose a growing link between security and development of 
democracy.”22 Liberal democratic values and norms have long been recognized as of 
paramount importance for the existence and functioning of the transatlantic security 
community. The desire to be part of Europe, translated into the application for 
membership in NATO and/or the EU, has been a strong driving force supporting 
democratic development in Albania as in most Eastern European countries. 
The literature on the third wave of democratization increasingly refers to the role 
of external factors, and focuses on conditionality as one of the dominant and most 
developed explanations of the EU’s effectiveness in bringing about democratic and 
market economy reforms in Central and Eastern European countries. In regard to the 
transition of Eastern European countries, the EU has assumed a prominent role as an 
                                                 
19 Martin Erdmann, NATO Assistant Secretary General for Political Affairs and Security, “NATO 
Enlargement-Past Present and Future,” CROSSROADS-The Macedonian Foreign Policy Journal, no. 3 
(2007): 16 (accessed 22 July 2009). 
20 Fred Tanner, “NATO’s role in Defense Cooperation and Democratization,” 
http://www.gcsp.ch/e/publications/Issues_Institutions/Int_Organisations/Academic_Articles/Tanner-
IntlSpectator-2004.pdf (accessed 22 July 2009). 
21 Donald Abenheim, “The Big Bang of NATO Enlargement: Gotterdammerung or Rebirth?,” 
Strategic Insights 2, no. 2 (2003). 
22 Sonia Lucarelli, “Peace and Democracy: The rediscovered link. The EU, NATO and the European 
System of Liberal-Democratic Security Communities,” http://www.otan.nato.int/acad/fellow/00-
02/Lucarelli's.pdf (accessed 22 July 2009). 
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external actor. In the case of Albania, conditionality can be defined as an agreement 
between the EU as an international organization and Albania as the country that must 
satisfy this organization’s requirements to gain membership. 
The successful use of conditionality as a political strategy depends, to a large 
extent, on the “reaction” of the Albanian elites to the EU’s stipulations regarding the 
necessary democratic reforms, which in the long run, will enable Albania to accede to the 
EU. Two arguments should be noted in relation to conditionality. The first reflects the 
EU’s incentives and concerns, in Heather Grabbe’s words, whether the “accession and 
transition are part of the same process and … [whether] preparations to join the Union are 
coterminous with overall development goals.”23 The second argument, as put forward by 
Kubicek, states that the use of conditionality does not guarantee that changes will occur 
in the direction intended by the external actor, such as the EU. He, therefore, raises the 
question “whether and under what conditions can conditionality actually work?”24 
Both arguments are taken into account in the analysis of Albania-EU relations in 
this thesis, particularly regarding the financial aid provided by the EU and the negotiation 
process of stabilization and association agreement.  
E. METHODS AND SOURCES 
This is basically a case study of the role of international organizations in 
promoting democratization. However, the arguments analyzed are based on a wide range 
of literature focusing on transition and democracy development, as well as on the role of 
international organizations in fostering democratization in other countries of Eastern 
Europe. The study focuses on the process of democratization in Albania since the 
collapse of the communist regime, the legacy of the past regime and the leverage exerted 
by three international organizations—the OSCE, NATO and the EU—in this process.  
                                                 
23 Heather Grabbe, “European Union Conditionality and the ‘Acquis Communautaire’,” International 
Political Science Review 23, no. 3 (2002): 253. 
24 Paul Kubicek, The European Union and Democratization (London, New York: Routledge, 2003), 
17. 
 9
By undertaking a chronological analysis of the post-communist developments in 
Albania, the thesis investigates the extent to which cooperation and membership in an 
international organization (the OSCE) helped the country democratize and carry out the 
democratic reforms necessary for membership in another organization (NATO). The goal 
of the Albanian people is to make the process of democratization irreversible and 
sustainable, and thereby a foundation for membership in a third international organization 
(the EU). 
In addition to the sources outlined in the literature review, the thesis relies on 
other policy declarations, statements by relevant officials, government sources, media 
sources, scholarly publications, and the author’s personal experience. 
F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
The thesis is organized as follows: Chapter I furnishes background, with a 
primary focus on the collapse of communism, and the establishment of political pluralism 
in Albania. Chapter II discusses the OSCE’s contribution to the development of 
democracy in Albania. This chapter also provides information regarding the potential 
future of the OSCE’s presence in Albania and the need for it to continue to provide 
expertise, particularly in the conduct and monitoring of elections. 
Chapter III focuses on the NATO enlargement process, including how criteria for 
membership affect the spread of democracy. Albanian-NATO relations and NATO’s 
leverage on democratic reforms in Albania are addressed in this chapter. The fourth 
chapter addresses Albanian-EU relations and focuses on the perspective of Albania 
joining the EU. Two main instruments used as conditionality levers—progress in access 
negotiations, and aid and technical assistance—are addressed in this chapter. Literature 
on this issue mostly covers the steps that Albania is required to take in the accession 
process rather than the slow pace of reforms. This chapter attempts to fill this gap. Based 
on research, the last chapter offers conclusions, focusing on further reforms to be carried 
out by Albania in order to make membership in the EU a reality in the near future. 
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II. ALBANIA AND OSCE 
This chapter discusses the role of the OSCE in the democratization process in 
Albania. It begins with a review of the collapse of the communist regime. It then 
examines Albania’s accession to the CSCE and the importance of CSCE participation for 
Albania. The chapter continues with the establishment of the OSCE Presence in Albania, 
its initial mandate, and the activities of the OSCE in Albania since 2003. Finally, this 
chapter considers the future of the OSCE, both in the international and the Albanian 
context. 
A. COLLAPSE OF COMMUNIST REGIME IN ALBANIA 
Dramatic changes in Eastern European countries followed the speech by U.S. 
President Ronald Reagan in Berlin in 1987.25 The end of the Cold War, symbolized by 
the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989, led the communist countries of Europe to a 
process of democratic change, which was described by Samuel P. Huntington as a “third 
wave of democracy.”26 The international political context of the late 1980s in Eastern 
Europe had a significant effect in Albania. With the fall of communism in much of 
Eastern Europe in 1989, prominent intellectuals, labor unions and university students 
became politically active and began to pressure the government for changes in policy. In 
                                                 
25 In 1987, President Ronald Reagan travelled to West Berlin, where he delivered a noteworthy speech 
on the theme of freedom. The speech was considered somewhat provocative at the time, and Reagan's own 
State Department had opposed the inclusion of the now-famous phrase "Mr. Gorbachev, tear down this 
wall!" The timing, however, was prophetic. On November 9, 1989, after Mikhail Gorbachev informed the 
West that the Soviet Union would no longer force Eastern European nations to stay within the Soviet orbit, 
the East German government opened the wall—effectively "tearing down" the barrier between not only 
East and West Berlin, but East and West Germany as well, 
http://www.nationalcenter.org/ReaganBerlinWall1987.html (accessed 17 June 2009).  
26 “At the end of the decade, the democratic wave engulfed the communist world. In 1988 Hungary 
began the transition to a multiparty system. In 1989 elections for a national congress in the Soviet Union 
produced the defeat of several senior communist party leaders and an increasingly assertive national 
parliament. In early 1990, multiparty systems were developing in the Baltic Republics and the Communist 
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response to these pressures, Albanian citizens were granted the right to travel abroad, 
some free-market measures for the economy were adopted, and religious freedom was 
restored. However, the government continued to tighten border control, and many young 
people were shot dead in their attempts to cross the border. The secret service was still 
strong and active in applying a hard policy against those opposed to the regime. In July 
1990, a large number of Albanians sought refuge on the territory of the Western 
Embassies in Tirana in their attempt to flee the country. This was a heavy blow for the 
government, as well as a clear indication of the communists’ decline of support in the 
nation’s internal politics. Regardless of the government’s further steps, mainly 
propagandistic and demagogic, the situation was deteriorating and international pressure 
was increasing. The concessions made were not sufficient to avoid the escalation of 
popular pressure for more political changes. Albania’s application to join the Conference 
on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) was rejected and made conditional to 
further political reforms and measures to ensure respect for human rights. 
With increasing international and domestic pressure for political changes, in 
December 1990, President Ramiz Alia was forced to accept political pluralism. This 
signaled an end to the communist party’s official monopoly of power. Following the 
strong demonstrations of university students, the creation of the first anti-communist 
party, in December 1990, marked the end of 45 years of communist rule and the 
establishment of a multiparty democracy in Albania. The “demonstration effect” as 
described by Huntington, with reference to the examples of other Eastern European 
countries, Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, and Romania in particular, otherwise called 
“neighborhood effects,”27 had a strong impact on Albania and contributed to the collapse 
of the communist regime. In contrast with the violent upheaval in Romania, the collapse 
of communism in Albania was made through a peaceful process as “the later 
democratizers learned about dangers to be avoided and difficulties to be overcome.”28  
However, Albania was the last East European country to put an end to the communist 
                                                 
27 Dirk Berg-Schlosser, “Neighborhood Effects of Democratization in Europe,” Taiwan Journal of 
Democracy 4, no. 2 (2008): 29–45. 
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regime. Different from the rest of the East European countries, in which the communist 
rule began to appear “softened,” allowing for some forms of political and economic 
liberalization, Albania experienced the harshest totalitarian regime in Europe for almost 
45 years. Complete isolation from the rest of the world was a characteristic of the 
communist regime in Albania. The “independent” or “national” communism, as asserted 
by Enver Hoxha in Albania, “proved to be an even greater handicap than sovietization, 
allowing postcommunist national elites to sidetrack the democratic transition.”29 
The first pluralist elections, which were held on 31 March 1991, failed to make a 
break with the communist past. The Party of Labor of Albania (PLA) won the elections, 
gaining more support in the rural areas than in the urban areas. However, the new 
Democratic Party (DP) won in the main cities of Albania.  The newly formed government 
was forced to resign after three months, due to its failure to effectively manage the hard 
economic situation. “The Albanians emerged from communism ill prepared for the 
painful transition to a market economy. The abrupt dismantling of the communist social 
welfare system, combined with the soaring rate of unemployment, left many citizens in a 
precarious position. . . . Moreover, the population in general, as well as the emerging 
political and economic elites, were unfamiliar with the workings of a market economy.”30 
The main political parties reached an agreement to form a coalition government and hold 
early elections in March 1992. 
The first international reaction was the acceptance of Albania as a participating 
state in the CSCE. Enjoying strong international support, the DP won a landslide victory 
in the elections on 22 March 1992. Ramiz Alia stepped down, and the DP leader, Sali 
Berisha, was elected president. “He pushed through a number of economic reforms, 
including mass privatization, and Albania received a substantial amount of assistance 
from the U.S., EU, IMF and World Bank.”31 
                                                 
29 Jacques Rupnik, “Eastern Europe: The International Context,” Journal of Democracy 11, no. 2 
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This was the beginning of a new era for Albania. The assistance received from the 
West was an indication of the support for the new democratic government and President 
Berisha. During this period, Albania joined NATO’s Partnership for Peace32 and the 
Council of Europe.33  Berisha skillfully used the international support to strengthen his 
internal positions. “His cautious foreign policy and his image as a modernizer won him 
plaudits, and he was able to use his reputation in the West to strengthen his domestic 
political position.”34 
However, internal politics were characterized by Berisha’s increasing 
authoritarianism which had been a frequent phenomenon in central and Eastern European 
countries in the transition from communism to the Western system. In a short time, 
Berisha succeeded in removing from office the General Prosecutor and the Chair of the 
Supreme Court. By this time, Berisha had complete control over the judiciary system, and 
the secret service had been reconstructed to serve the DP’s interests. 
B. ACCESSION OF ALBANIA TO OSCE 
Trying to improve the image of the regime internationally, throughout 1990 the 
communists requested that Albania be awarded the status of a CSCE participating state. 
In June 1990, at the Copenhagen meeting, Albania was granted the status of a CSCE 
observer, a sign of Western support for the improvement of human rights in the country. 
However, Albania had much to do in order to become a participating state in the CSCE. 
Messages from the CSCE, and its participating states, to Albania were clear: the country 
must accept political pluralism and establish a market economy. In a statement in May 
1990, the U.S. Helsinki Commission emphasized: “As a participant in the Helsinki 
process, Albania will have to commit itself to respect the rights of its citizens to freedom 
of expression, association, and assembly, as well as freedom of movement. It will accept 
the concepts of political pluralism and the rule of law and to that end move toward free 
                                                 
32 Albania signed the PfP Agreement on 23 February 1994. 
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elections and undertake necessary legal reforms.”35 In September 1990, Ramiz Alia36 
attended the UN General Assembly session “in an attempt to improve the image of his 
regime and to make a personal plea for Albania’s admittance as a full member of the 
CSCE.”37 In October 1990, Albania hosted the meeting of the Balkan Foreign Ministers’ 
Conference in an attempt to begin a new era of foreign policy. At the same time, Albania 
hoped to receive the support of neighboring countries for its full participation in the 
CSCE. 
Further attempts to receive status as a participating state failed also at the CSCE 
Paris meeting of November 1990. “The implication of this event was that Albania needed 
to carry out fundamental reforms in order to be accepted as a full-fledged member of the 
international community.”38 However, the international pressure on Albania for political 
pluralism and respect for human rights proved to be critical factors in the collapse of the 
communist regime. 
Intense developments followed the first pluralist elections, which were held on 31 
March 1991. The newly formed communist government was forced to resign and a new 
coalition government was formed following an agreement of Albanian political parties. 
“The agreement between the communists and the opposition parties . . . symbolized a 
shared determination to prevent the country from sinking into total chaos.”39 The reaction 
of the CSCE participating states was immediate. On 19 June 1991, very shortly after the 
new coalition government was approved by the National Assembly, Albania was 
accorded full recognition as a participating state of the CSCE. “Membership afforded 
Albania a degree of protection against external aggression that it probably had not 
enjoyed previously. It also committed Albania to respect existing international 
                                                 
35 U.S. Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, CSCE News release (Washington D.C.) 
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Press, 1998), 41. 
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boundaries in Europe and basic human rights and political freedoms at home.”40 Albania 
was henceforth included in the agenda of senior international leaders and officials, a sign 
of support on its road to democratic development. 
The visit of James Baker, then the U.S. Secretary of State, the first high-level visit 
ever made by an American official to Albania, on 22 June 1991, only three days after 
Albania was admitted as a participating state of the CSCE, was a clear indication of the 
United States’ support for democratic and economic reform in Albania. Baker said, "On 
behalf of President Bush and the American people, I come here today to say to you: 
Freedom works. At last, you are free to think your own thoughts. At last you are free to 
speak your own mind. At last you are free to choose your own leaders. Albanians have 
chosen to join the company of free men and women everywhere."41 In his speech in the 
presence of hundreds of thousands of people jammed into the main square of Tirana, 
Baker urged the Albanian people to move forward to democracy, as the country could not 
afford delay. 
C. IMPORTANCE OF OSCE PARTICIPATION FOR ALBANIA 
With 56 states drawn from Europe, Central Asia and North America, the OSCE 
(formerly the CSCE) is the world's largest regional security organization, bringing 
comprehensive and co-operative security to a region that stretches from Vancouver to 
Vladivostok. It offers a forum for political negotiations and decision-making in the fields 
of early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation, 
and puts the political will of the participating states into practice through its unique 
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designed to guide relations between participating states, and it “broadened the concept of 
security far beyond the way states and most experts thought about international 
security.”43 
Inclusiveness in participation is often described as the main advantage of the 
organization. In contrast with NATO and the EU, which “were particularly influential 
over the last fifteen years or so in their immediate neighborhoods because they were able 
to offer the prospect of membership in return for adherence to their rules or for following 
their examples,”44 the CSCE’s conditionality for participation is not highly exigent. 
However, CSCE participation had genuine significance for Albania after a period of 45 
years of communist rule. The period since the end of the Cold War has been 
characterized by political uncertainty. Albania’s participation in the CSCE meant having 
an important channel of communication with other countries and institutions and “being 
present when the parties debate issues of European security.”45 With Albania in, the 
CSCE could be more effective in influencing future democracy developments in the 
country. Accession to the CSCE marks the start of a period of state socialization for 
Albania. According to Emilian Kavalski, “This socialization occurs in terms of altering 
policy-making through compliance and learning, and in changing external behavior.”46 
Participation in the CSCE, and shortly thereafter, membership in other 
international organizations, including the Council of Europe and the International 
Monetary Fund, opened Albania to the socializing influences of international agents, 
enabling the country to build the democratic institutions and capacities required to carry 
out and implement its international obligations. This process would prepare the country 
for future membership in the principal Euro-Atlantic organizations—NATO and the EU.  
The complexity and dynamics of this process constituted a real challenge for the 
Albanian people and state elites. With its “ups and downs,” the process took a longer 
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time than anticipated, because of the difficulties of the transformation of elites and the 
reform of government, and the relative lack of a unifying theory and plan for such 
political and social reforms with the aid of multinational organizations. 
D. ESTABLISHING THE OSCE PRESENCE IN ALBANIA 
Field missions are the major assets of the OSCE helping “the organization carry 
out its functions effectively.”47 The geographic focus of the field missions has been 
concentrated in the former Soviet Union states and the Western Balkans, including 
Albania. The OSCE engagement in South-Eastern Europe, in particular, “has defined the 
modern history of the OSCE. .  . . The OSCE has been in this region every step of the 
way since the early 1990s, walking with the peoples and communities of the countries of 
South-Eastern Europe through tension and war and working tirelessly to build peace and 
confidence.”48  The 1999 Istanbul OSCE summit pointed out that “the development of 
OSCE field operations represents a major transformation of the Organization that has 
enabled the OSCE to play a more prominent role in promoting peace, security and 
compliance with OSCE commitments.”49 Cooperation with the host countries is critical 
for carrying out the mission mandate. “Field missions have turned out to be an effective 
tool for managing pre-conflict and post-conflict situations because they put internationals 
on the ground for the long term, where they can understand the dynamics and build 
relationships with local officials.”50 Furthermore, field missions have been instruments 
for enhancing cooperation between the OSCE and other international organizations 
operating in their respective states. 
The establishment of the OSCE Presence in Albania is related to the crisis in early 
1997, which was caused by the collapse of pyramid financial schemes, not atypical of the 
phenomena associated with the capitalist transition after 1989 in certain parts of Europe.  
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The despair and discontent of the people were expressed in spontaneous and increasingly 
violent demonstrations that turned into riots and finally into an uprising. “By the time 
pyramid schemes began to fail at the beginning of 1997, Albania had no functioning 
democratic institutions or fora through which the mounting public discontent could have 
been channeled.”51 
The violence was then transformed into a largely uncoordinated uprising against 
the Berisha regime. The use of public order police, secret police and army troops against 
the protesters added fuel to the fire. Hundreds of thousands of weapons were taken from 
military depots, the authority of the police collapsed, and the country descended into 
anarchy. Albania’s apparent economic miracle turned into an economic and social 
disaster.  
The uprising focused international attention on Albania. The need for coordinated 
action propelled the OSCE into a mediator position. The OSCE Chairman in Office 
designated the former Austrian Chancellor, Franz Vranitzky, to mediate between Berisha 
and the opposition parties. His main task was to conduct a dialogue among Albanian 
political leaders during the run-up to the early parliamentary elections scheduled for 29 
June 1997. The arrangement to replace the DP government by what was called the 
government of National Reconciliation, under a Socialist Prime Minister, was agreed by 
the main Albanian political parties on 9 March 1997.  “The situation in Albania in 1997 
presented a formidable task for the newly formed OSCE Presence. Earlier that year, this 
long isolated Balkan country, a newly admitted member to the OSCE and Council of 
Europe, found itself sliding into crisis. Following attacks on political targets, criminal 
activity mushroomed. Many Albanian citizens fled to Italy and Greece. Foreigners were 
evacuated. In short, the government had lost control of the country.”52 
Vranitzky’s highly effective diplomatic performance and his excellent 
negotiations skills in interactions with various Albanian political actors were critical in 
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managing the crisis. Furthermore, “Vranitzky’s efforts were helped by the broad unity of 
purpose of the key foreign countries, the U.S. as well as Italy and Greece within the EU. 
As several governments now judged Berisha to have become a destabilizing force in 
Albania and possibly beyond his country’s borders, their publicly unstated purpose was 
to ease Berisha out of office through the ballot box.”53 
E. INITIAL MANDATE OF THE OSCE 
Thanks to this strong international support, Vranitzky’s mission paved the way for 
the establishment of the OSCE Presence in Albania in March 1997. The initial mandate 
included two main areas: (a) democratization, the media and human rights; and (b) 
election preparation and monitoring.  In a climate of high political tension and total lack 
of public order, the preparation and conduct of elections were not easy tasks. On 28 
March 1997, the UN Security Council authorized a group of member countries, led by 
Italy, to establish a multi-national protection force (MPF) in Albania.  The OSCE’s 
primary role was to keep the election preparation timetable on track and to ensure that the 
election would be held under the best possible conditions.  “In his attempts Vranitzky’s 
main weapon was the threat that no foreign assistance would be forthcoming unless a 
democratic vote was held to produce a credible administration. This was a potent 
message. Albania was, once again, in desperate need of financial help. No Albanian 
political leader could risk the prospect of being blamed for depriving his country of 
foreign aid.”54 
Regardless of the public order issue (especially in the southern part of Albania) 
the OSCE was able to provide a contingent of over 500 international observers, including 
100 parliamentarians, the largest mission ever dispatched in Albania. With regard to 
technical assistance, the OSCE was directly involved in advising the Central Election 
Commission, writing training brochures for the election officials, printing ballot papers 
(to ensure complete secrecy, they were printed in Italy), and distributing them all around 
                                                 
53 Gabriel Partos, “Albania Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management,” 4. 
http://www.ciaonet.org/wps/pag01/ (accessed 16 March 2009). 
54 Ibid. 
 21
the country. Although the situation in Albania was hardly conducive to free and fair 
elections, the 29 June 1997 elections took place relatively smoothly. “Although great 
difficulties during the past few weeks caused many observers to doubt the ability of the 
Albanian authorities to conduct successful elections, the large turnout of voters 
demonstrated that Albania, in close co-operation with the OSCE, was able to hold 
elections in a reasonably orderly fashion.”55 
While the OSCE final report qualified these elections as “acceptable given the 
prevailing circumstances,” it lacked qualitative expressions such as “the elections were 
free and fair,” “the elections met international standards” or “the elections were in 
compliance with OSCE and Council of Europe commitments.” Rather than an assessment 
of the election process, the final report was, instead, a strong appeal by the OSCE 
addressed to the Albanian political class. “The results of this election can be the 
foundation for a stable democratic system, which Albanians want and deserve. It is 
essential, however, that all Albanian political parties observe the commitments they have 
made to respect the results of the election and not to interfere in any way with the 
counting process or the conduct of the second round. We recall that the international 
community expects a major effort towards national reconciliation after the elections. 
Without such reconciliation, there will be no basis for defining the terms of international 
aid.”56  As anticipated, the Socialist Party won the elections. In accordance with a 
declaration made prior to the elections, President Berisha resigned and a new socialist-led 
coalition government was formed. 
The conduct of the 29 June 1997 elections was a success for the OSCE Presence 
in Albania. By this time, the OSCE was highly respected and favorably accepted 
throughout the country. However, this was only the first step in the process of the 
rehabilitation and establishment of democratic institutions in Albania, a process in which 
the OSCE was prepared to play a key instrumental role. The new government faced the 
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enormous tasks of restoring public confidence in the state and rebuilding the country 
from scratch. Establishing public order was a critical issue, given the 700,000 small arms 
illegally possessed by the population. 
This required both short-term specific projects as well as long-term financial and 
technical assistance. The World Bank, the IMF and the EU became important players in 
this process. “After the elections the [OSCE] Presence, besides helping the country to 
arrange its relations with the donor community, entered into close relationship with its 
many and varied Albanian partners in order to encourage social and political dialogue, 
and to strengthen democratic values and culture in the country.”57 
Later in 1997, the OSCE Presence was charged with coordinating the work of 
other international organizations and bilateral donors. Thus, the OSCE became the core 
of the “Friends of Albania Group,” by assuming a leading role in bringing both domestic 
and international actors together to work on stabilizing the situation. The group included 
ambassadors to Albania from the European Union (EU) countries, the United States, the 
European Commission, and the Council of Europe. 
The Istanbul Summit reaffirmed the OSCE commitment “to assist Albania as it 
continues its social, political and economic reform process following the setbacks caused 
by the upheaval of 1997 and the Kosovo refugee crisis of 1999. Noting the recent 
progress, we call upon the Government and all political parties to improve the political 
atmosphere, thereby strengthening democratic institutions. We encourage the new 
Government of Albania to continue its fight against crime and corruption. The OSCE is 
committed to continue its assistance and to work closely with the European Union and 
international organizations within the framework of the Friends of Albania.”58 
Subsequent to the close attention to the fragile political situation, in addition to 
helping mediate between the main political parties, the OSCE Presence developed a 
range of long-term human dimension activities, as well as media and NGO support.  
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Furthermore, with the establishment of the Parliamentarian Commission responsible for 
drafting the constitution, the OSCE Presence was directly involved in the drafting 
process. 
In order to expand its capacities to assist in the development of the rule of law in 
Albania, the OSCE Presence opened its Office of the Legal Counselor in the first half of 
1998. At this time, to help facilitate OSCE activities out of Tirana, field offices were 
established in three other main cities in Albania. A military and security liaison officer 
was appointed to facilitate assistance to the Albanian police in developing an arms 
collection program.  It was the OSCE contribution that the main European Parliamentary 
Institutions (including the European Parliament, the Parliamentarian Assembly of the 
OSCE and the Council of Europe) visited in Albania twice (in December 1997 and June 
1998) to appeal to the Albanian political class for closer cooperation concerning the 
country’s priorities in the process of building democracy and strengthening democratic 
institutions. 
With the main opposition party (DP) boycott of the Parliament, the OSCE 
Presence initiated and organized a systematic multi-institution program to observe 
parliamentary procedures. This included issuing bi-weekly reports on parliament, and 
sharing them with political parties and representatives of diplomatic and international 
organizations. However, pursuant to its mandate, until 2003 the main focus of the OSCE 
Presence continued to be election assistance and monitoring. In addition to the elections 
in 1997, the assistance continued with the national referendum for the constitution, local 
government elections in 2000, and parliamentary elections in 2001. 
The assistance aimed at strengthening the management and administrative 
capacities of election management bodies, the Central Election Commission in particular, 
improving voters’ lists and civil registries, training local election administration staff, and 
delivering a nation-wide voter education campaign. 
F.  OSCE ACTIVITY AFTER 2003 
The beginning of 2003 is, beyond any doubt, a significant milestone in the 
development of democracy in Albania. During his visit to Albania on 31 January 2003, 
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Romano Prodi, then the President of the European Commission, opened negotiations on 
the Stabilization and Association Agreement59 between the EU and Albania. 
Taking into account the progress made by Albania in consolidating democratic 
institutions, as well as the increasingly central position that the country’s institutions have 
taken, the Permanent Council of the OSCE decided to update the OSCE Presence 
Mandate to reflect the developments in Albania. According to the new mandate, the 
OSCE Presence will focus on: legislative and judicial reform, including property reform; 
regional administrative reform; electoral reform; parliamentary capacity-building; anti-
trafficking and anti-corruption measures, including supporting the implementation of 
relevant national strategies; development of effective laws and regulations on the 
independent media and its Code of Conduct; promotion of good governance and targeted 
projects for strengthening civil society; and police assistance, in particular, training for 
border police, within a coordinated framework with other international actors in the 
field.60 The new mandate provided for more OSCE input in building democratic 
institutions and strengthening democracy in Albania. The OSCE made contributions in 
four main areas during this period: property reform, address and civil registry 
modernization, parliamentary support, and electoral reform. 
The issues of property rights and security of tenure and ownership have a distinct 
impact on the social, economic and political aspects of Albania. The lack of secure 
property rights hinders the economic development of the country as well as the 
development of a property market. This contributes to corruption and is the main source 
of civil court disputes.  Property registration information is needed to support a wide 
variety of current initiatives such as the resolution of the property restitution and 
compensation issue, the on-going process of government decentralization, urban and 
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regional planning, and improvements to the country’s infrastructure, tourism 
development and natural resource management. The OSCE Presence’s involvement in 
the field of property dates back to 2002, when it launched a political process to draft the 
Law on Restitution and Compensation of Property. 
High demographic mobility, especially after 1997, strongly demanded that the 
update of the civil registry reflect the on-going changes due to this unregulated mobility. 
The OSCE is helping the government modernize the address and civil registry system. 
This effort is part of the Technical Assistance Project, which is funded by the European 
Union, the United States and the OSCE. The project, among others, aims at implementing 
modern address and civil registration systems, reviewing the required legislation, and 
providing capacity building to relevant central and local institutions.61 The most 
important output of the project is the creation of the electronic National Register of 
Citizens, which will serve as the data source to a number of public services in the 
country, including ID card applications. Creation of the electronic register will also help 
improve the quality of voter lists in Albania, an issue that has been debated in past 
elections in the country. 
Leaving behind the first phase (2001–2006), which was focused mainly on 
training parliament staff, the new OSCE project for 2008–2010 intends to help the 
Assembly become more transparent and to strengthen its efficiency and oversight 
responsibilities.62 Specific support is foreseen for parliamentary committees with a focus 
on European integration issues.  The project, which is funded by the Netherlands, is 
intended to help the National Assembly become a more effective institution that can 
fulfill its role as a forum of political debate and a mechanism for government oversight 
and control. At the same time, the National Assembly should become a more transparent 
and responsive institution that takes public opinion into consideration. 
As mentioned previously, election assistance has been one of the primary areas of 
OSCE assistance in Albania. While that assistance started in 1997, it is still a central 
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focus of OSCE activity. Elections are one of the most important instruments of 
democracy, and the way in which they are conducted is a fundamental indicator of a 
country’s democratic development. Prior to 1997, Albania lacked the institutional 
capacities to manage elections or educate citizens about democratic politics. To meet 
these needs, the OSCE provided assistance and expertise to the Central Election 
Commission (CEC) in election planning and administration, and to government 
institutions and the National Assembly in electoral law development. 
The OSCE electoral unit is involved in planning and carrying out further reform 
of the legal framework for elections, and it helps build the capacity of relevant national 
institutions and civil society actors.63 OSCE election assistance in Albania has been 
shaped to comply with the ODHIR recommendations after each election. 
Polarization of the election administration in Albania, complex and problematic 
rules for the allocation of parliamentary mandates, the adjudication of complaints and 
appeals, and the transparency of the election process have been the main concerns 
regarding elections in Albania. Hence, OSCE assistance has focused on drafting and 
improving electoral laws. Other technical aspects of elections were addressed by other 
international organizations such as the International Foundation for Election Systems 
(IFES) and the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI). 
In June 2007, OSCE/ODIHR and the European Commission for Democracy 
through Law (known as the Venice Commission) issued a joint opinion on the 
amendments to the electoral code of Albania,64 with the intention of assisting the 
Albanian authorities in their stated objective to further improve the national legal 
framework for democratic elections. ODIHR observation reports issued after each 
election, in addition to the problems identified, also reflect the progress made by the 
Albanian institutions in election administration. These reports show the ups and downs of 
the election progress in Albania. For example, according to a 2003 report, “The 12 
October 2003 local government elections in the Republic of Albania marked further 
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progress towards compliance with OSCE, Council of Europe and other international 
commitments and standards for democratic elections.”65 
According to a 2005 report, “The conduct of the 3 July 2005 parliamentary 
elections, during the pre-election period, voting, and counting so far, complied only 
partially with OSCE Commitments, Council of Europe commitments, and other 
international standards for democratic elections.”66  However, the same report identified 
good progress with regard to technical aspects of election administration: “For the most 
part, the CEC administered the process transparently, professionally and in line with the 
provisions of the Electoral Code.”67 
The next elections held in Albania were those for local government in February 
2007. “While the 18 February 2007 local elections provided for a competitive contest, 
they were another missed opportunity for Albania to conduct elections fully in line with 
OSCE Commitments, Council of Europe commitments and other international standards 
for democratic elections.”68 As noted, OSCE/ODIHR assessments of the elections in 
Albania vary from “marked further progress” and “complied only partially with OSCE 
Commitments, Council of Europe commitments, and other international standards for 
democratic election” to they were “another missed opportunity for Albania to conduct 
elections fully in line with” these commitments and standards.  The ODIHR reports not 
only provide guidance about what needs to be accomplished for an election to be in 
compliance with international standards, they also appeal to the OSCE to continue to 
provide assistance and expertise to Albanian institutions and political parties. The  
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creation of the electronic National Civil Registry and the new Electoral Code are 
significant examples of the OSCE’s continuing contribution to the further 
democratization of Albania. 
G. THE FUTURE OF THE OSCE IN ALBANIA 
1. International Context  
The new political situation in Europe, especially with the enlargement of NATO 
and the EU, has raised the issue of the future of the OSCE in the new international 
security context in Europe. Since its inception, the OSCE has always been instrumental in 
“the transformation of Europe from the Cold War to the post-Cold War era,”69 reflecting 
the changing needs of participating states as well as the transforming context of European 
and global affairs. The EU, the Council of Europe, and NATO address some of the same 
issues as the OSCE but from different angles or perspectives, and they “have all more or 
less successfully adapted to the new international political and security landscape.”70 At 
the same time, with the successful enlargement of the EU and NATO, “there is a 
tendency at the political level to devote less attention to the OSCE, which has 
increasingly disappeared from public view. In many countries, the OSCE is rarely placed 
high on political agendas in Capitals.”71 However, the critical situation of the OSCE 
requires high-level political attention by the participating states. Furthermore, “the OSCE 
institutions should be restructured to reflect today’s challenges from the emerging new 
security architecture of Europe.”72 
After more than 30 years of activity, the Finnish Foreign Minister has declared, 
what the OSCE needs at the moment is “a new spirit of Helsinki.”73 To this end, it is not 
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a coincidence that the OSCE Ministerial Council held in Helsinki in December 2008 
addressed the necessity for a revitalization of the organization and the need to change 
current practices of cooperation. The President of Finland said, “We should not assume 
that current practices of co-operation will continue forever unchanged. In discussing our 
future co-operation we should, however, build on the solid foundation of our common 
values and commitments. They have enabled Europe to broaden democracy, strengthen 
the rule of law and bring universal human rights and fundamental freedoms to its 
people.”74 Regardless of the significant changes in Europe, the OSCE has proved to be a 
highly adaptable institution. Meeting future challenges successfully will require the 
understanding, dialogue and support of all participating states. To this end, the informal 
meeting of the OSCE foreign ministers launched the “Corfu Process” in order to take the 
European security dialogue forward.75 
The Athens Ministerial Council of the OSCE on 1–2 December 2009 further 
advanced the dialogue on European security, and it provided “an important opportunity to 
send out a clear message of unity on the need for enhanced dialogue complemented by 
joint action.”76 The declaration adopted at this OSCE Ministerial Council called for the 
re-establishment of trust and confidence and urged participating states to “do more to 
promote human rights and foster tolerance.”77 According to the OSCE Chairman-in-
Office, Greek Prime Minister and Foreign Minister George Papandreou, “addressing 
security problems in the OSCE area would be a long-term endeavour.”78 
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2. National Context 
The OSCE has a long history of providing assistance to Albania, which began 
with the country’s accession as a participating state in 1991. Since the establishment of 
the OSCE Presence in Albania in 1997, Albania-OSCE relations have covered a wide 
range of activities, from crisis management to democratic consolidation. The progress 
made by Albania in strengthening democratic institutions, the rule of law, and respect for 
human rights and minorities constitutes a factor of stability and security in the region. 
This progress is also a clear indicator of the OSCE’s contribution over the years. 
The long history of assistance has been mutually fruitful, not only for Albania as host 
country, but also for the OSCE. It is an example of cooperation that leads to peace and 
stronger social and political institutions. The OSCE priority has been to strengthen and 
consolidate democratic institutions and values, good governance and the rule of law, as 
well as to foster regional cooperation, in order to accelerate Albania’s integration into 
Euro-Atlantic institutions. The OSCE Presence in Albania has also been the key partner 
in the implementation of joint projects with the EU, through the European Commission, 
the Council of Europe and other international organizations and institutions. However, it 
should be noted that OSCE missions are not intended to stay forever. 
The Istanbul Document of 1999 points out the importance of the field missions. It 
also provides that “the host country of an OSCE field operation should, when 
appropriate, be assisted in building its own capacity and expertise within the area of 
responsibility. This would facilitate an efficient transfer of the tasks of the operation to 
the host country, and consequently the closure of the field operation.”79 
In line with the international debate on the future of the OSCE, in 2008, the 
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democratic reality in the country. A senior government official stated, “Albania has 
reached a level where it needs to be in charge of processes using the growing professional 
capacities of Albanian institutions.”80 
Two important events in the development of democracy in Albania should be 
noted. First, the process of negotiations with the European Union, which officially started 
on 31 January 2003, was finalized with the signing of the Stabilization and Association 
Agreement between the Republic of Albania and the European Communities on 12 June 
2006. The SAA became effective following its ratification by the parliaments of 25 
member states and the Albanian Parliament.81 Second, the issue of the mandate of the 
OSCE Presence in Albania was raised shortly after the NATO Summit at Bucharest,82 
where the NATO Allies invited Albania to join the Alliance. With Albania then close to 
NATO membership, the assumption was that the OSCE should adapt its mandate 
pursuant to the new reality of the country. While official communications with the OSCE 
headquarters were not made public, various daily newspapers published communications 
between the Albanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the OSCE Chairman in Office. The 
intention of the Albanian government seems to have been to make NATO membership 
the first step in the “phase-out cycle” of the OSCE presence in the country. 
The opposition strongly objected to the idea and related it to the government’s 
wish to avoid the OSCE Presence’s involvement in the elections to the National 
Assembly scheduled for 28 June 2009. Other international institutions, while supporting 
the OSCE’s contribution to the democratization of the country, called the request 
unnecessary. 
Although Albania has made remarkable progress in the process of integration to 
Euro-Atlantic structures, much still remains to be done in fighting organized crime and 
corruption, promoting the rule of law, reforming the judicial system, conducting electoral 
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reform, and implementing reforms on property and lustration law. The “Advancing 
Freedom and Democracy Report” of the U.S. Department of State identifies areas where 
further progress and attention are required. “The government generally respects the 
human rights of its citizens. However, there are problems in some areas, including 
widespread corruption, poor prison and pretrial detention conditions, security force abuse 
of prisoners and detainees, and human trafficking. The government exercised measures 
during the year that undermined the independence of key institutions such as the 
judiciary, the Prosecutor’s Office, and the media.”83 
Albania became a member of NATO on 1 April 2009, shortly before the 
Strasbourg-Kehl Summit of 3–4 April 2009. This was a significant accomplishment for 
Albania and a sign of its democratic maturity. However, NATO membership is only the 
beginning. NATO integration is a long process, which requires the continuation of 
democratic reforms and the strengthening of democratic institutions, thus making Albania 
a functioning democracy worthy of being part of the Euro-Atlantic democratic family of 
nations. 
Despite the criticism by international organizations, as mentioned above, there is 
no doubt that Albania has entered a new phase of political consolidation and democratic 
development. While the OSCE has also helped to accelerate progress, the question arises: 
Is Albania at a stage that meets all OSCE commitments? Although the conduct of free 
and fair elections on 28 June 2009 constituted a good opportunity for Albania to leave the 
past behind and confirm the progress and strengthening of its democracy, reports by the 
international observation missions concluded that these elections were not in complete 
compliance with international standards. “The 28 June 2009 parliamentary elections in 
Albania marked tangible progress with regard to the voter registration and identification 
process, previously a contentious issue, and the legal framework, adopted in a consensual 
manner by the two main parties. These improvements were overshadowed by the 
politicization of technical aspects of the process by political parties and violations 
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observed during the election campaign which undermined public confidence in the 
election process.”84 Although these elections demonstrated that the Albanian people are 
capable of building a democratic society like those in other European countries, “greater 
efforts still need to be made by all political forces in order to meet demanding 
international standards."85 
The International Observation Mission appealed to the Albanian elites and 
political parties “to work hard in order to establish confidence among the citizens for a 
democratic electoral process.86 Despite observed improvements, free and fair elections in 
full compliance with the international standards and OSCE commitments still remain an 
unattained objective for Albania. This is why activities related to democratization and the 
development of civil society should remain the Presence’s main tasks ahead.  
Building a democratic society requires cultivating a democratic culture and 
strengthening the institutions of democracy. In that regard, much still remains to be 
accomplished by Albania and its political elites. In view of the international and domestic 
context, it would be advantageous for the OSCE to continue to be active in Albania and 
to adapt its mandate, based on constructive discussions with the Albanian stakeholders, 
with a primary focus on those areas where further improvement is required. A number of 
challenges lie ahead for Albania beyond NATO membership towards EU accession, and 
the OSCE should continue to assist in that process. 
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III. ALBANIA AND NATO 
The focus of this chapter is the role of NATO in the democratization of Albania. 
First, it briefly outlines the major processes that led to the accession of Albania to NATO, 
and then discusses NATO enlargement during and after the end of the Cold War. The 
chapter also examines the relationship between NATO enlargement and the spread of 
democracy. The second part of the chapter addresses NATO’s impact on democratic 
reforms in Albania, the reform of the Albanian Armed Forces, and challenges beyond 
NATO membership. 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In April 2008, the Heads of State and Government of the NATO Allies made the 
following statement: “Our invitation to Albania and Croatia to begin accession talks to 
join our Alliance marks the beginning of a new chapter for the Western Balkans and 
shows the way forward to a future in which a stable region is fully integrated into 
Euro-Atlantic institutions and able to make a major contribution to international 
security.”87 NATO’s invitation to Albania to begin accession talks marked the 
culmination of a long relationship that dates back to shortly after the collapse of the 
communist regime. Among the countries of the former Eastern communist bloc, Albania 
was the first to apply for NATO membership. From the very beginning, Albania 
considered association with a highly democratic international organization, such as 
NATO, “an early chance to break with the vestiges of an authoritarian past.”88 
Since Albania joined the North Atlantic Cooperation Council in 1992, Euro-
Atlantic integration has consistently been a major strategic objective of all Albanian 
governments and political parties. In 1994, Albania expanded its relationship with NATO 
by signing the Partnership for Peace Agreement, as soon as PfP emerged, as “the 
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principal mechanism for forging practical security links between the Alliance and its 
Partners and for enhancing interoperability between Partners and NATO.”89 Bilateral 
cooperation with NATO increased progressively, afterwards, in light of the country’s 
membership aspirations. 
In 1995, Albania developed its first Individual Partnership Program (IPP), and in 
1996 the country entered the Planning and Review Process (PARP). The declaration at 
the 1999 Washington NATO Summit, which confirmed the Alliance’s determination to 
remain “open to all European democracies, regardless of geography, willing and able to 
meet the responsibilities of membership, and whose inclusion would enhance overall 
security and stability in Europe,”90 and the achievement of the Membership Action Plan 
(MAP) constitute significant steps for Albania on its road towards future membership in 
the Alliance. 
Subsequently, Albania was involved in an intensified period of preparation and 
cooperation with NATO, a period that was successfully concluded on 1 April 2009, 
shortly before the Strasbourg-Kehl Summit on 3–4 April 2009, with the accession of 
Albania to NATO. This was not only the result of long years of hard work, during which 
Albania had “shown a relentless drive to complete the necessary reforms,”91 but also a 
historic achievement for Albania on its path out of the misfortune of the 20th century and 
the isolation it imposed on the country. 
Almost 18 years after the collapse of the communist regime, Albanians would 
proudly confirm their return to the West. NATO accession not only constitutes a 
democratic milestone for Albania, it also opens perspectives for a better future for the 
Albanian people as part of the civilized family of nations. 
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B. NATO ENLARGEMENT DURING THE COLD WAR 
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is a political-military security 
organization established in 1949, with the signing of the Washington Treaty, a pact that 
provides for political consultation, economic cooperation, and collective defense. An 
organization of twelve initial members (Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, 
Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom and the 
United States) in 1949, it has since grown to 28 members through six rounds of 
enlargement (1952, 1955, 1982, 1999, 2004, and 2009).  
The enlargement of the Alliance is an ongoing and dynamic process, which was 
anticipated by its author’s right from the foundation of the Alliance, and which has 
transformed the organization greatly over the years. The basis for NATO enlargement is 
expressed in Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which states that “The Parties may, 
by unanimous agreement, invite any other European State in a position to further the 
principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area to 
accede to this Treaty.”92  
Three rounds of enlargement took place during the Cold War period. In 1952, 
Greece and Turkey joined the Alliance, thus securing stability and security in 
Southeastern Europe. The Federal Republic of Germany and Spain joined the Alliance 
respectively in 1955 and 1982. The political context, factors and conditions in which 
enlargement took place need to be accounted for. In 2007, Martin Erdmann, NATO’s 
Assistant Secretary General for Political Affairs and Security Policy, wrote, “In the 
context of the East-West conflict, one could argue that each additional new member was 
in essence a good thing. After all, within the zero-sum logic of the East-West 
competition, each new member meant more military clout for the Alliance vis-à-vis the 
Warsaw Pact.”93 
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The end of the Cold War and the change in the geo-political environment 
provided new opportunities to expand the Alliance in the struggle to promote a new 
European order. The end of the Warsaw Pact and the collapse of communism throughout 
Eastern Europe led these former Soviet satellites to establish new relations with the 
NATO member countries. In June 1991, the North Atlantic Council stated, 
The long decades of European division are over. We welcome the major 
increase in the contacts by the Alliance and its members with the Soviet 
Union and the other countries of Central and Eastern Europe, as they 
accept the hand of friendship extended by Alliance Heads of States and 
Government in London last year. We welcome the progress made by the 
peoples of these countries towards political and economic reform. We 
seek to build constructive partnerships with them in order further to 
promote security and stability in a free and undivided Europe which will 
recognise the political, economic, social and ecological elements of 
security, along with the indispensable defence dimension.94 
This statement was the prologue of an intense period of relations between the 
Alliance and Eastern European countries, which led to further rounds of enlargement in 
1999, 2004 and 2009, and the admission of new members into the Alliance. In other 
words, to quote Martin Erdmann, “the more democracy would eventually spread 
throughout Europe, the more countries would be eligible to join. . . .  Yet today, this logic 
has moved to the very center of the NATO enlargement process.”95 
C. NATO POST-COLD WAR ENLARGEMENT—CRITERIA FOR 
ADMISSION 
The end of the Cold War and the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe 
changed the context of NATO enlargement, which had hardly been an issue in the last 
phase of the cold war. “The decision to enlarge the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) represents the most serious and complicated transformation in Europe’s security 
arrangements since the collapse of the Berlin Wall.”96 Shortly after 1991, the countries of 
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Central and Eastern Europe declared their intention to join the Alliance which itself was 
unclear about even the potential of such a seemingly radical change in the confusion of 
this particular year in which the Yugoslav crisis exploded, the Gulf War was fought, and 
the USSR collapsed. NATO membership—that is, participation in a multinational 
collective defense framework—would help stabilize the democratic achievements in 
these countries. In the words of Larry Diamond, a professor at Stanford University, “First 
in Southern Europe and now in Central and Eastern Europe, a powerful incentive has 
been the prospect of integration into the great security and economic communities of the 
West: NATO and the European Union. No external force will do more to secure and 
deepen democracy in the region than continuing integration.”97 
According to Larry Diamond, this is the most compelling rationale, beyond even 
the need to enhance regional security, for NATO enlargement. To this end, and to 
respond to the changing circumstances in Europe, new institutions like the North Atlantic 
Cooperation Council and Partnership for Peace were developed by NATO, representing 
the “Alliance’s initial efforts to institutionalize cooperative relations with former 
adversaries and other non-NATO countries in the Euro-Atlantic region . . . . [T]he 
Partnership for Peace has functioned as a pathway to NATO membership for some 
nations.”98 While taking into account the new circumstances at the end of the Cold War, 
the 1995 Study on NATO Enlargement concluded that “there was both a need for and a 
unique opportunity to build improved security in the whole of the Euro-Atlantic area, 
without recreating dividing lines.”99 
The Study, which is a detailed public road map for governments wishing to join 
NATO, developed a list of criteria that aspirant countries were required to meet prior to 
consideration for NATO membership. In essence, these criteria were similar to the EU’s 
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Copenhagen criteria of 1993,100 adapted to a NATO context. In doing so, both NATO  
and the EU “developed a meritocratic enlargement policy that linked EU and NATO 
membership credibly to democratic reform and consolidation.”101 Before being invited to 
join the alliance, candidates must:   
• have functioning democratic political systems based on a market 
economy;  
• be committed to democratic civil-military relations and institutional 
structures; 
• treat minorities according to OSCE standards; 
• solve disputes with neighboring countries and demonstrate a commitment 
to solving international disputes peacefully; and 
• have the ability and willingness to make a military contribution to the 
Alliance and to achieve interoperability with alliance members.102 
The decision to undertake the enlargement of NATO to include the East European 
countries was made clear by U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright. In February 
1997, shortly before the July 1997 NATO Summit, Albright wrote that “Now the new 
NATO can do for Europe’s east what the old NATO did for the Europe’s west: vanquish 
old hatreds, promote integration, create a secure environment for prosperity, and deter 
violence in the region where two world wars and the cold war began.”103 
The July 1997 Summit of NATO in Madrid, Spain, marked a new phase in the 
history of NATO, not only because of the first enlargement decisions concerning specific 
countries since the end of the Cold War, but also because of the commitment to the 
further enlargement of the Alliance. While confirming the progress achieved in the 
internal adaptation of the Alliance, the Heads of State and Government declared that “a 
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new Europe is emerging, a Europe of greater integration and cooperation. An inclusive 
European security architecture is evolving to which we are contributing, along with other 
European organisations. Our Alliance will continue to be a driving force in this 
process.”104 For the first time since the publication of the Study on NATO Enlargement 
in 1995, the Alliance extended invitations to the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland to 
begin accession talks with NATO, a process that was formally concluded on 12 March 
1999. 
Furthermore, the Madrid Summit reaffirmed that NATO remains open to new 
members under Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty. “The Alliance expects to extend 
further invitations in coming years to nations willing and able to assume the 
responsibilities and obligations of membership, and as NATO determines that the 
inclusion of these nations would serve the overall political and strategic interests of the 
Alliance and that the inclusion would enhance overall European security and 
stability.”105 This was not only an encouragement to other aspirant countries to continue 
with democratic reforms in their countries, but also an assurance that enlargement was a 
continuing process. The Alliance expressed its commitment to extend further invitations 
in the coming years to nations willing and able to assume the responsibilities and 
obligations of membership.  The Prague Summit of November 2002, known as the 
“Transformation Summit” marked NATO’s “change from a military alliance geared for 
conflict against the Soviet Union to a more flexible alliance with new capabilities for new 
threats.”106 
By this time, however, the main NATO concern had become combating 
international terrorism in the wake of the September 2001 terror assaults on the U.S. 
mainland. Although enlargement was considered a secondary issue at the Summit, NATO 
extended accession invitations to seven European states: Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. This was the largest post-Cold War 
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enlargement of NATO. The Allies stated that their objective was to strengthen “security 
for all in the Euro-Atlantic area, and help achieve our common goal of a Europe whole 
and free, united in peace and by common values.”107 
The most recent round of NATO enlargement was initiated at the April 2008 
Summit in Bucharest, Romania, at which the Alliance extended invitations to Albania 
and Croatia to begin accession talks. The Alliance declared that the accession of Albania 
and Croatia “will enhance the Alliance's ability to face the challenges of today and 
tomorrow.”108 It also marked, they stated, “the beginning of a new chapter for the 
Western Balkans and shows the way forward to a future in which a stable region is fully 
integrated into Euro-Atlantic institutions and able to make a major contribution to 
international security.”109 The enlargement of NATO to the Western Balkans will also 
contribute to the political stabilization of southeastern Europe.  
For a candidate state to be invited to join the Alliance there must be consensus 
among the current member governments in support of an invitation. Each candidate is 
considered separately by the Allies. One or more votes against a state means that it may 
not move to the next stage in the process of becoming a member, as happened in 1997 in 
the cases of Slovenia and Romania. A dispute between Greece and the Former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia, over the latter’s constitutional name, blocked its application to 
begin accession talks. NATO supports a resumption of the negotiations without delay and 
expects them to be concluded as soon as possible. Therefore, “NATO agreed that an 
invitation to the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia will be extended as soon as a 
mutually acceptable solution to the name issue has been reached.”110  
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The process of NATO accession for Albania and Croatia was finalized on 1 April 
2009, shortly before the Strasbourg-Kehl Summit, which marked the 60th anniversary of 
NATO. From an organization of 12 members in 1949, in 60 years NATO grew to 28 
members. 
D. NATO ENLARGEMENT AND THE SPREAD OF DEMOCRACY 
The preamble of the North Atlantic Treaty provides for democracy as one of the 
most important principles of NATO, and indicates that democratic values will be 
protected through collective defense, as specified in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. 
“The Parties to this treaty . . . are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage 
and civilisation of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual 
liberty and the rule of law. They seek to promote stability and well-being in the North 
Atlantic area.”111  
The post-Cold War enlargements of NATO have provoked a debate as to whether 
the Alliance has contributed to democratization of European states. There are grounds to 
argue that NATO has contributed to democratization and continues to do so, in particular 
in those member states admitted after the end of the Cold War from the former 
communist bloc. Cooperation with NATO has affected the democratization agenda in the 
East European countries in the security and defense sector and beyond. Since the end of 
the Cold War NATO membership has been a consistent political objective of East 
European countries, “a prospect that has given NATO tremendous leverage over these 
states’ domestic and foreign policies.”112 Furthermore, the new democracies sought 
membership in NATO as an instrument that would help these states “cement transitions 
to democracy.”113 
Even though NATO did not sponsor an explicit democracy promotion program, 
through the Partnership for Peace program and the Membership Action Plan, the Alliance 
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has encouraged democratic control over the armed forces and transparency of national 
defense decision-making and budgeting, which are essential policies in democratic 
consolidation, especially in countries in which power was concentrated in a party-state 
apparatus that collapsed quickly and with a messy legacy. Criteria put forward in the 
Study on NATO Enlargement require that countries aspiring to membership in NATO 
must adopt certain democratic standards before being considered for accession. 
“Although NATO by no means triumphs in all its endeavors to shape the policies of 
aspiring and member states, it does exercise considerable influence if it so chooses where 
certain domestic conditions prevail. Exploiting the political fluidity inherent in post-cold 
war transitions, for example, NATO cultivated transnational coalitions that supported the 
alliance’s democratizing, denationalizing agenda.”114  
Debates over NATO enlargement and the spread of democracy followed the 1999 
inclusion of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. Proponents of the idea that 
“NATO membership has not and will not advance democratization in Europe”115 support 
their argument with the NATO enlargement during the Cold War, focusing on the cases 
of Greece, Portugal, Spain and Turkey. This argument was a backward looking one of 
opponents of NATO during the Cold War, but it sprang to life once more in altered 
circumstances after 1995. It is true that the political and security circumstances that led 
the Alliance to include these countries during the Cold War were significantly different 
from those after the Cold War. The end of the Cold War allowed the Alliance to consider 
giving “practical content to its long standing vision of a peaceful political order in 
Europe.”116 Moreover, all of these countries have moved beyond their non-democratic 
phases of the past, and all of them, except Turkey, are currently members of the European 
Union.117  
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The post-Cold War period offers another opportunity to evaluate the question of 
whether NATO membership can facilitate democratization, because during this time 
democratization efforts have involved non-members. In the cases of the Czech Republic, 
Hungary and Poland, some observers hold that NATO membership did not speed the 
democratization process, “because their societies and their elites were committed to 
democracy anyway. History reveals that these states had made long strides toward 
democracy even before the NATO carrot was dangled before them.”118 From this point 
of view, these countries “chose democracy because it was the will of the majority; the 
ruling leaderships and publics favored membership; and the leaderships began to request 
entry following the installation of democratic institutions in each country.”119  
The fact that the leaders of these countries pressed for membership in NATO as 
early as 1992 or 1993 does not necessarily mean that democracy was fully established 
and consolidated in these countries. The uncertain fate of security and defense institutions 
in these critical years also suggests that democracy and peace were not foregone 
conclusions in the hours after the East Germans abandoned their border fortifications in 
1989. Almost all East European countries asked for NATO membership shortly after the 
collapse of their communist regimes. The establishment of a competitive electoral 
system, although important for a healthy democracy, is not enough, and “free elections 
are not the only measure of democracy.”120 However, the three countries in question 
were arguably ahead of other Eastern European countries as far as democracy 
development is concerned. NATO and the EU began to play an important role in the 
transition of these countries, helping them to democratize, carry out the necessary 
political and economic reforms, and thus meet the membership criteria. 
Democratization in these three countries has been successful, compared with the 
rest of the East European countries. This is why “NATO accepted those countries 
requiring the least assistance with their efforts to democratize. This does not nullify the 
                                                 
118 Dan Reiter, “Why NATO Enlargement Does Not Spread Democracy,” International Security, 14, 
no. 4 (2001): 64. 
119 Ibid. 
120 Rachel A. Epstein, “NATO Enlargement and the Spread of Democracy: Evidence and 
Expectations,” Security Studies, 14, no. 1 (2005): 66. 
 46
argument, however, that through the MAPs the alliance has helped promote democracy 
and accelerate economic reform in those countries not accepted in the first round of 
enlargement. MAPs provide a ‘road map’ to aid those countries not accepted in preparing 
for future membership.”121  The national and international contexts in which democracy 
is being developed in the East European countries, especially in the Baltic countries, need 
to be accounted for. “They are very new democracies, with little experience in 
democratic government, and face serious economic, social and political problems. 
Indeed, for some the failure to achieve NATO membership may itself be a source of 
destabilization, because they think that membership in Western organizations might help 
them resist the Russians. These states want all the insurance they can get.”122  
In his address to the North Atlantic Council at the January 1994 Brussels Summit, 
President Bill Clinton stated that, “If democracy in the East falls, then violence and 
disruption from the East will once again harm us and other democracies.”123 It is hard to 
prove that NATO enlargement will not enhance democratization by citing examples of 
military coups in Greece and Turkey during the 1960s and the reversions to autocracy 
that these countries experienced. “NATO has never sanctioned, much less ejected, a state 
for domestic political changes.”124  
Democracy development received special vigor and became a strong driving force 
in Eastern Europe in the 1990s, and the general impetus toward democratization has been 
sustained in this region. However, the trajectory of democratic development has not been 
the same everywhere, and NATO influence on the reform process has been different in 
each country. This is why “East European states should be distinguished according to 
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their level of democratization.”125 In the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia, 
democratization has arguably been more successful than in Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia 
and other countries that joined NATO in later rounds of enlargement. “Countries with no 
democratic traditions before the fall of communism need greater guidance from 
international institutions than do those that are more democratically advanced.”126 This is  
why NATO MAPs have been of great importance for Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, 
FYROM and Romania. These countries had almost no experience with democracy prior 
to 1990.  
Although the argument that EU membership would better serve democratic 
reforms is correct, these countries decided to apply for NATO membership “when they 
realized that joining the EU would not be possible in the near future.”127 This is the 
reason why almost all East European countries “focused their early post communist 
efforts on satisfying NATO’s less rigorous membership criteria.”128 Because of their lack 
of democratic experiences, democracy consolidation in these countries requires a long 
time; and “insofar as democratic consolidation depends on the stability afforded by robust 
security arrangements full membership in the Atlantic Alliance is actually, from the 
perspective of democracy, a more important objective than EU integration.”129  
With the exceptions of Albania and Croatia, which joined NATO in 2009, all the 
countries that have joined the Alliance since the end of the Cold War are now members 
of the EU. This fact is an indication of the power of NATO incentives and of the 
Alliance’s contribution to democratization in these countries. What NATO has helped 
accomplish in these countries has its origin in the years following the end of the Cold 
War, when NATO based its transformation on liberal principles, primarily driven by the 
United States, with a view to NATO’s enlargement eastward. Two of the most important 
NATO programs after the Cold War, PfP and MAP, not only embedded the democratic 
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requirements and criteria necessary for future membership, but also “strengthened NATO 
democratic governance identity by requiring the new NATO member states to comply 
with the provisions on civil-military relations and the democratic control of the armed 
forces.”130  More than 20 years after the collapse of communism, there is no doubt that  
today Eastern Europe is more democratic than at any time in its history, and in that 
regard, “NATO enlargement has been a major element of Europe’s democratic 
consolidation.”131  
Since early 1990, increasingly “shared liberal democratic values and norms are at 
the heart of NATO’s legitimacy.”132 The Alliance has dedicated significant efforts to 
democratization and defining security as closely linked to democracy. The common 
Atlantic democratic values, as expressed by the authors of the Washington Treaty of 
1949, “are as constant today as they were when the alliance was created.”133  
Post-Cold War NATO enlargements, security documents and practices “expose a 
growing link between security and development of democracy.”134 Liberal democratic 
values and norms have always been recognized as standards of paramount importance for 
the existence and functioning of the transatlantic security community. The desire to be 
part of the Euro-Atlantic security community, translated into the pursuit of membership 
in NATO and/or the EU, has been a strong driving force supporting democratic 
development in all Eastern European countries. 
E. ALBANIA’S INITIAL STEPS ON THE ROAD TO NATO MEMBERSHIP 
The elections of March 1992 marked a break with the communist past in Albania. 
The opposition won a landslide victory, which surpassed even the most optimistic 
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predictions.  As Elez Biberaj has observed, “the post communist government was faced 
with formidable challenges in reforming the military and restoring civilian control over 
the armed forces.”135 For the first time, a civilian with no previous military experience 
was appointed Minister of Defense. Radical reforms were required to create a 
professional and depoliticized army.  
On 6 June 1992, shortly after the first democratic government was established, 
Albania was accepted as a member of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC). 
The NACC “represented NATO’s first attempt to go beyond ‘military contacts’ and 
‘regular diplomatic liaison’ with the states of the Warsaw Pact (a treaty that was formally 
disbanded in July 1991) and to develop—in the words of the November 1991 Rome 
Declaration—‘a more institutional relationship of consultation and cooperation on 
political and security issues.’”136 The NACC was composed of the sixteen NATO 
countries and twenty other states, all former Warsaw Pact states or former Soviet 
republics, and in its procedures and method of operation was “no different from the 
OSCE: a gigantic talking shop.”137  
The NACC marked the beginning of institutionalized cooperation between 
Albania and NATO at time in which no consensus existed on the enlargement of the 
Alliance, but the need to address the security vacuum in central and Eastern Europe grew 
more intense. Exchange visits of senior Albanian officials and military officers at NATO 
headquarters in Brussels and NATO senior officials in Albania helped increase the 
public’s knowledge and understanding of the alliance. They culminated with the visit of 
NATO Secretary General Manfred Wörner, the first ever by a NATO Secretary General, 
in March 1993. In his address to the Albanian Parliament, Wörner said that the purpose 
of his visit was "to extend the hand of cooperation to Albania... and to discuss what we 
can do together to deepen our cooperation and make it as relevant as possible to your 
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concerns."138 Wörner emphasized that the Alliance was prepared to assist the country "to 
build modern armed forces that can not only preserve your [Albania’s] independence but 
also be our partners in upholding cooperative security in Europe."139  
Albania occupies a strategic location in southeastern Europe, and as “war raged 
across the former Yugoslavia, Albania’s importance to NATO grew steadily.”140  In that 
regard, Albania’s membership in the NACC and later in Partnership for Peace helped 
establish parameters of defense reform from an early stage. A genuine domestic political 
consensus and strong public support for closer relations with NATO have been 
instrumental in the success of these reforms, “which can not be understood without taking 
into account the crucial role of NATO.”141 
F. PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE 
The launching of the Partnership for Peace initiative at the January 1994 Brussels 
Summit proved to be a major political step by NATO. The Framework Document states 
that 
This Partnership is established as an expression of a joint conviction that 
stability and security in the Euro-Atlantic area can be achieved only through 
cooperation and common action. Protection and promotion of fundamental 
freedoms and human rights, and safeguarding of freedom, justice, and peace 
through democracy are shared values fundamental to the Partnership. In 
joining the Partnership, the member States of the North Atlantic Alliance and 
the other States subscribing to this Document recall that they are committed to 
the preservation of democratic societies, their freedom from coercion and 
intimidation, and the maintenance of the principles of international law.142 
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PfP was designed to increase confidence and to promote cooperative efforts to 
reinforce security. It offered Albania not only a true possibility of strengthening its 
relations with NATO, in accordance with its own specific interests and capabilities, but it 
also turned out to be a key element of the country’s process of integration into the 
alliance. Albania joined the PfP, which soon became “a pan-European security institution 
with greater military and political content than the OSCE,”143 on 23 February 1994. By 
signing the PfP Framework Document, Albania strongly confirmed its interest in close 
cooperation with NATO. Albanian policy-makers judged that the security, integrity and 
protection of the country’s democratic achievements and national interests could best be 
guaranteed through cooperation and integration with NATO as a security organization. 
“Viewed from an Albanian perspective, PfP is not simply an initiative to bring Eastern 
European armies more in line with those of NATO or merely a program to coordinate 
activities. It is first of all, an ambitious initiative intended to enhance stability and 
security globally, in Europe, and regionally in the Balkans and Mediterranean.”144 
Albania did not intend to be merely a passive bystander, but rather an active participant. 
In that regard, PfP increasingly served as a new and appropriate institution through which 
Albania could not only deepen and intensify its ties with the alliance, primarily in the 
security area, but also facilitate the transmission of NATO practices to Albania as a 
partner.  
In the Albanian context, PfP gained a wider and more political dimension by 
including the promotion of democratic principles. This is why PfP was strongly 
supported by the entire Albanian political spectrum. However, the Albanian government 
was aware that the pursuit of NATO membership constituted a much more complicated 
and long-term process, which definitely required high standards for democratic society 
and government and free market economic development. By signing the PfP agreements 
and engaging in active participation, Albania demonstrated its strong intention and 
commitment to become a NATO member in the future.  Hence for the Albanian elite, it 
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was clear that “participation advances a perception of a common purpose among other 
partners, which tends to facilitate their cooperation both within NATO and among 
themselves.”145  
During the period leading to accession, Albania was not only a security consumer, 
but also a security provider. It was involved in Alliance activities and contributed to 
NATO-led operations in Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Iraq. Albania played 
an important role in supporting Allied efforts in 1999 to end the humanitarian tragedy in 
Kosovo and secure the peace after the air campaign. Albania has also hosted and 
participated in a range of PfP exercises and activities, and contributes to the fight against 
terrorism through its participation in the Partnership Action Plan on Terrorism. This 
includes sharing intelligence and analysis with NATO, enhancing national counter-
terrorist capabilities, and improving border security. Furthermore, a considerable number 
of Albanian military officers and civilian officials have received training and education at 
the NATO Defense College in Rome, the NATO School in Oberammergau, and in the 
United States and other NATO countries.  
Albania’s cooperation with NATO was an outstanding case of successful PfP 
activity, which “in the case of Albania has broken new ground in the evolution of PfP and 
has confirmed its position as a key element in the new European security structure.”146 
The increased cooperation between Albania and NATO, both in the military and political 
areas, especially after 1999, shows the socialization impact of the PfP initiative, which 
proved to be a useful NATO mechanism in influencing military reform and promoting 
democracy in Albania. 
                                                 
145 Emilian Kavalski, Extending the European Security Community Constructing Peace in the 
Balkans, 162. 
146 George Katsirdakis, Albania: A case study in the practical implementation of Partnership for 
Peace, NATO Review, Web edition, 46, No. 2 (1998): 22–26, http://www.nato.int/docu/review/1998/9802-
07.htm (accessed 26 July 2009). 
 53
G. DEMOCRATIC REFORM OF THE ALBANIAN ARMED FORCES – THE 
ROLE OF NATO 
The overall transformation of Albanian society, which followed immediately after 
the establishment of a democratic political system, required a restructuring of the 
Albanian Armed Forces along more accountable, efficient and sustainable lines. The 
immediate objective was de-politicization of the armed forces and the establishment of 
democratic civilian control, as a fundamental aspect of democracy development, based on 
“institutional mechanisms, oversight, and professional norms.”147 As the military was 
deeply penetrated by the communist party, de-politicization of the army was the main 
challenge of the reform. Given the long communist legacy of the country, democratizing 
the armed forces in Albania would necessitate: 
• that multiple channels of civilian control and oversight be established; 
• that civilians in positions of authority over the military be democratically 
accountable; and 
• that large segments of the military-security apparatus, which had 
previously been the exclusive domain of military authority, be 
significantly civilianized.  
Steps taken thereafter included the appointment of a civilian defense minister to 
whom the General Staff answers, the establishment of a civilianized ministry of defense, 
the creation of a parliamentary defense committee that exercises political oversight, and 
the definition of a transparent defense budget. In light of NATO requirements, the reform 
of the Albanian armed forces sought “a system of checks and balances in which the 
executive, government, parliament and society (through the media and NGOs) all shared 
in oversight,”148 a system that had hardly ever been imagined or considered before in 
Albania. 
Reform of the armed forces was necessary not only to accommodate the new 
security policy and defense doctrine, but also to respond to the changing security 
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requirements at the national and international levels. “Meeting NATO standards for 
defense capability was potentially a force for both democratic reform and military 
modernization in Albania.”149 Wide public support and enthusiasm for NATO, 
particularly after 1999, proved to be a significant motive for defense reforms. In practical 
terms “almost all changes within the Albanian Armed Forces are the result of the goal of 
NATO membership.”150 The Albanian elites sought NATO membership not only as the 
best security guarantee, but also as a cultural choice, and an outstanding accomplishment 
in “returning to Europe,” the motto of the Albanian people since the collapse of the 
communist regime in late 1990.  
The reform process included three main components as emerged in the process of 
the general political transition in Europe especially as it applied to the security sector and 
political culture in Albania: legal, procedural and conceptual, and professional.  
1. Legal Framework  
To ensure democratic and civilian control of the armed forces, the Albanian 
constitution provides for the main dispositions that regulate civil-military relations and 
responsibilities in times of war and peace. The Parliament is the main institution 
responsible for the control of the military and its structures. It approves the strategic 
documents on national security and defense policy. The parliamentary defense committee 
is the principal instrument through which the Parliament exercises democratic control 
over the armed forces. It is an instrument that oversees the implementation of the defense 
budget, checks and assesses the efficacy of the existing laws, and recommends 
amendments as required.  
The President of the Republic is the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces. In 
peace time, the President exercises his authority over the armed forces through the Prime 
Minister and the Minister of Defense, while in wartime, he leads the armed forces 
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through the Commander of the armed forces. Upon the proposal of the Prime Minister, 
the President appoints and dismisses the Chief of the General Staff. 
The Prime Minister and the Council of Ministers prepare and propose the legal 
framework, the budget, and the main documents on defense policy. The Minister of 
Defense, a civilian by the constitution, represents the highest official, in peacetime, of all 
military and civilian personnel of the armed forces. He is responsible to the Parliament, 
the President, and the Prime Minister for implementing the defense policy. 
The Chief of the General Staff is appointed for a three-year term. In his daily 
work, the Chief of Staff cooperates with the Minister of Defense, while in wartime he is 
the Commander of the Armed Forces. He is responsible to the President, the Prime 
Minister, and the Minister of Defense, an arrangement that provides for the neutrality of 
the post. 
2. Procedures and Concepts 
This component of the reform included the establishment of arrangements for the 
smooth functioning of the military, the exercise of democratic and civilian control, the 
streamlining of respective responsibilities and competences, and the organization of 
command and control mechanisms, all of which were aimed at improving the efficiency 
and accountability of the army. As part of this process, military ranks, which were 
abolished during the communist regime, were introduced and implemented as a 
significant step towards the establishment of a professional and modern army. 
Publication of the 2002, 2005 and 2007 National Military Strategies constituted a 
new approach for Albania in the post-communist era, and each of them indicates the 
significant changes Albania has undergone. The military strategies have been oriented 
towards the accomplishment of on-going initiatives targeted at NATO membership. Their 
publication has served to increase transparency and accountability in the security and 
defense sector and has been intended to inform the public of the activity of the Armed 
Forces. Albania’s accession to NATO requires a review of the National Military Strategy 
in order to better respond to the new circumstances and challenges that Albania faces as a 
member of the Alliance.  
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3. Professional Component 
The restructuring of the Albanian Armed Forces (AAF) required the 
transformation of military capabilities, including the complete or partial closure of 
garrisons and the relocation of units. Personnel, infrastructure, and equipment must be 
capable of meeting contemporary challenges. The main objectives included the reduction 
and right-sizing of the armed forces, increasing operational capabilities, and 
modernization. The aim of the AAF restructuring, which is planned to be completed by 
2010, “is to achieve a smaller but more capable force with appropriate financial 
resources.”151 Increased professionalism of the armed forces occupies a central place in 
the long-term development plan of the AAF. In the process of transformation, “the 
presence of NATO has provided much-needed orientation and a road map to follow, 
together with the financial aid that is indispensable for Albania to reach the necessary 
standards for joining the North Atlantic Alliance.”152  
The plan put forward by the Albanian government in 2000 included two stages: 
first, to transform the AAF into a smaller but more efficient force between 2000 and 
2004, and second, to modernize them between 2005 and 2009. In 2002, Albania launched 
a ten-year defense reform strategy that was sponsored by the U.S. Department of Defense 
“in order to trim down and thoroughly modernize the AAF.”153 During the past 17 years, 
the AAF has undergone a long and difficult downsizing and transformation process. The 
decision to focus AAF efforts on NATO membership, an environment of new threats, and 
contributions to U.S. and NATO-led operations in Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
and Iraq led to a radical evolution of the force structure and defense mindset within the 
AAF. The AAF has made significant strides towards the transformation from an 
internally focused territorial defense organization into a modern, flexible, and agile force 
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that can perform effectively in a national defense role as well as part of a deployed 
multinational contingent. However, transformation is an ongoing process. To that end,  
The Albanian Armed Forces are currently undergoing an extensive defense 
reform process, which consists in the transformation of the strategic concept, doctrine, 
organizational structure, personnel management, military infrastructure, training and 
education, the transformation of the systems and equipments as well as that of many 
other elements. This is an analytical and continuous process based on the constant 
assessment of the security environment and lessons learned, and associated with the 
related reflections in the interest of a better execution of the AAF mission.154  
The alliance has inspired many positive changes in Albanian defense institutions. 
NATO incentives have helped the democratization of the country, “a process through 
which institutions, practices, and norms are transmitted between international actors.”155  
H. MEMBERSHIP ACTION PLAN 
NATO's Washington Summit, in April 1999, introduced the Membership Action 
Plan (MAP), in part to convince the aspirant countries that Article 10 and the Open Door 
policy were genuine and to assist the aspirants in developing forces and capabilities that 
could operate with NATO under its new Operational Capabilities Concept (OCC). 
Although the 1995 Study on NATO Enlargement identified the main criteria for 
admission, MAP went further in defining what an aspirant country needed to accomplish 
on the path to membership.  
While the Membership Action Plan “does not replace the Partnership for Peace 
(PfP) programme,”156 as a NATO program of advice, assistance and practical support 
tailored to the individual needs of the country, MAP was an instrument for assessing the 
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progress made by Albania towards full NATO membership. As an aspirant country, 
Albania was expected to carry out significant reforms in political and economic fields, 
defense and military issues, resources, security issues and legal aspects. Although 
“participation in the MAP does not guarantee future membership,”157 it de facto put 
Albania on track to join the Western military alliance. It was considered both a vehicle 
and an intermediary stage toward NATO membership. The object of MAP was to direct 
Albania to do those things that are going to be essential if it wants to be an effective ally, 
“that is producers, and not just consumers of security.”158 The implementation of the 
NATO Membership Action Plan accelerated and focused the development of the defense 
structures of Albania. With the establishment of a national legal and strategic framework, 
military reform has been guided primarily by external actors and through the mechanisms 
of MAP, making it, therefore, a project of national and international importance. 
The country joined the MAP initiative in 1999, and became a NATO member in 
April 2009. In contrast to other MAP partners, Albania experienced strong public support 
for NATO, particularly after the Kosovo conflict. However, it took almost ten years for 
Albania to complete the reforms necessary for membership, and to demonstrate that it is 
able to further the principles of the 1949 Washington Treaty and contribute to the 
promotion of security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area.  
Immediately after receiving MAP status, Albania regulated its activities by 
focusing on targets and priorities of the plan. A good example is the signing of the 
Adriatic Partnership Charter (or A3) by Albania and two of its neighbors, Croatia and the 
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, in May 2003. This initiative “is an indication 
of the shared vision for peace and stability in Southeast Europe.”159 At the same time, it 
promoted cooperation that progressively led these countries closer to Euro-Atlantic 
structures, with accession to NATO as their final goal. 
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Since 1999, MAP “has provided an effective new framework through which 
NATO has been able to motivate further reforms . . . and to offer guidance for the 
identification of priorities in allocating scarce resources. In these and many other 
instances, the causal links between incentives created by NATO and domestic policy 
changes are clear.”160 MAP enabled NATO to make the evaluation process more 
structured and rigorous, thereby “keeping the readiness of each aspirant for membership 
under review,”161 maintaining the leverage mechanism over Albania as an aspirant 
country, “inducing positive changes in specific policy areas,”162 and thus making a 
significant contribution to the democratization of the country. The perspective of NATO 
membership provided for “positive incentives for democratization.”163 In that regard, the 
accomplishment of the reforms anticipated in MAP had a strong pro-democratic effect 
and established the fundamental basis for the consolidation of democracy in Albania.  
MAP was not simply an activity involving only military and security issues. In 
addition to defense and military issues, restructuring and modernization of the Armed 
Forces, and implementation of Partnership Goals, the reforms carried out during the MAP 
cycle included political and economic areas, judicial matters, public administration and 
service, and the conduct of elections in compliance with international standards. NATO 
support has enabled Albania “to make good progress in its fight against corruption, 
organized crime, trafficking and terrorism, and to advance its political, judicial and 
economic reform programs.”164 
The processes of reform and adjustment on the road to NATO membership had an 
important impact on building democratic institutions in Albania, thus making 
membership in the Alliance the final confirmation of its democratic legitimacy and the 
validation of its stable democracy, free market and dynamic civil society. 
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I. CHALLENGES BEYOND NATO MEMBERSHIP 
Gaining NATO membership has been the most important achievement of post-
communist Albania, and a significant indication of the democratic development of the 
country. Although Albania is a new democracy, NATO membership is a model that 
inspires continuous economic and political development. However, democratization is a 
continuing process, and as such it never ends. It takes time because it requires not only 
the establishment of new institutions, but also widespread trust in them, which almost 
never develops quickly. In the new circumstances, international socialization is a 
complex process of transferring values, norms and standards of policy formulation. It is a 
process “which does not end with membership, but carries on inside the organization as 
well.”165  
To understand the socialization power of NATO, it is important to consider the 
two aspects of socialization, “compliance (socialization by international organisations) 
and learning to comply (socialization in international organisations).”166 Albania’s 
accession to NATO marks the end of the “compliance” aspect. However, the second 
aspect has growing importance for Albania, particularly as the country is preparing for 
potential membership in the European Union. While membership in the Alliance is the 
conclusion of a long relationship, integration into the Alliance is a much longer process 
related to “the development of the national capabilities in the political, economic, 
military, financial, legal and information security areas. Development of these 
capabilities takes normally longer than the date of membership in the Alliance, implying 
both the contributions to and the benefits from the collective security of a member 
country. Such things are not supposed to be met at the first day of membership in the 
Alliance.”167  
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In other words, as a NATO member, Albania faces the challenge of carrying out 
its obligations by constructing the required framework for their practical implementation. 
Although Albania is a small country, these challenges take on special importance for it as 
NATO is reinventing itself in the changing global security circumstances and developing  
its new Strategic Concept,168 a process that “calls for an inclusive and participatory 
approach from the biggest to the smallest Ally.”169 From the military perspective, 
integration requires the completion of the transformation of the Albanian Armed Forces 
pursuant to NATO’s “nine pillars” DOTMELPFI concept: doctrine development (D), 
organization structure (O), training and exercises (T), material modernization (M), 
education system (E), leadership development (L), personnel management (P), facilities 
development (F), and interoperability of declared military units with other NATO 
countries (I).   
As a new ally, Albania is expected to “integrate into the NATO collective defence 
planning process, taking in the national responsibilities of contribution with military 
forces, sharing also the budget, the military personnel, infrastructure and other 
resources.” 170 Although the Albanian Armed Forces have done a lot to comply with 
NATO requirements, the challenges ahead require a focus on the quality of their 
transformation, and increased “capabilities for effective participation in the Alliance.”171 
From a political perspective, the accession of Albania to NATO is an indication of 
“international recognition of a country's democratic credentials.”172 While the country  
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has already applied for candidate status with the EU, being a member of NATO will help 
Albania as a democratizing state and lead to greater stability in the Balkan region and 
beyond.  
NATO membership bears importance not only at the national level by providing 
“an important signal to mass publics and a key means to lock in democratic 
institutions,”173 but also at the international level by sending “a credible signal to 
international audiences to follow through on political reform.”174 Only through its 
continuous commitment to further political and economic reforms will Albania gain the 
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IV. ALBANIA AND THE EU 
This chapter examines the role of the European Union in the process of 
democratization in Albania and its impact on shaping the country’s domestic political 
development. It first addresses EU conditionality in the context of the political transition 
in Central and Eastern European countries. It then focuses on how the instrument of 
conditionality has worked in the case of Albania and Albanian political elites’ reactions 
to this strategy. It also examines the two main instruments used as conditionality levers: 
aid and technical assistance, and progress in access negotiations, and it explores how the 
Albanian elites have responded to EU membership incentives. 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Like NATO, the European Union has been an important external driver of 
political change in Albania. As in other Eastern European countries, the prospect of the 
EU membership has been a powerful instrument, encouraging major economic and 
political reforms and affecting the functioning of domestic institutions. It has also been “a 
powerful factor in shaping the internal and external policies pursued by political 
actors.”175 Particularly since 2000, Albania has made real progress in building 
democratic institutions, improving economic performance, and promoting regional 
cooperation. In a speech to the European Affairs Committee of the German Bundestag in 
2004, Chris Patten, then the Commissioner for External Relations, stated:  “In many ways 
the people of Albania suffered more than any other during the period of communist rule. . 
. . Freedom of expression and independence of thought were so completely crushed that it 
has been very hard to create a stable and democratic country out of this awful inheritance. 
. . . The perspective of membership is very clear and as Europeans we want to see the 
Albanian people move forward in this process.”176 Albania got rid of the totalitarian 
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communist regime in late 1990. However, as Geoffrey Pridham argues, “democracy is 
not born of an immaculate conception, but inherits a variety of past legacies that may 
complicate the regime change.”177 In that regard, subsequent events illustrated the impact 
of past legacies in the democratization process of the country. For Albania, with a hard 
and long communist past, the EU, in other words the “return to Europe,” was a grand 
political project not only associated with the democratic stability and economic 
prosperity of Western Europe, but also with the democracy, security, and human rights 
that Albanian society had long desired. This political project also derives “from a strong 
identification with Western values and norms as well as with the Western European 
international community,”178 from which Albania had been cut off for forty-five years 
under communist rule. 
While EU enlargement is considered perhaps the most effective foreign policy 
tool of the European Union, the process of qualifying to join the EU offers Albania a 
prospect of stability, democracy, and further economic development. It has provided 
powerful incentives that have shaped the political agenda of the Albanian elites. 
However, the way in which the Albanian elites have responded to the incentives of EU 
membership, how well they have reflected the preference of Albanian society for EU 
membership, remains an issue for discussion. It is “perhaps one of the most debated 
matters in the national public and political discourse.”179  
Although EU-Albania relations started as early as 1991, when the country was 
included in the EU PHARE assistance program,180 it was only in 2006 that the country 
concluded a Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA), and thereby established a 
new contractual relationship with the EU in an advanced stage towards membership. The 
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primary objective of the SAA, which entered into force on 1 April 2009, was to support 
the consolidation of democracy, the rule of law, economic development and regional 
cooperation. Hence, the Stabilization and Association Process (SAP) is intended to help 
Albania build the required capacities “to adopt and implement EU law, as well as 
European and international standards.”181 The SAP opens a concrete accession 
perspective, and remains the framework for Albania’s European Union course, all the 
way to its future accession. The European Union’s conditions for enlargement provide 
that “any European country which respects the principles of liberty, democracy, respect 
for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law may apply to become a 
member of the Union.”182 As with other Central and Eastern European countries, the 
success of democratic reforms in Albania is a prerequisite for joining the European 
Union.  
On 28 April 2009, shortly after Albania became a member of NATO, the 
Albanian government applied for the status of candidate with the EU. As a political 
decision, it sought to take advantage of the new status the country enjoyed as a NATO 
member. The application would also have a domestic impact with elections to the 
National Assembly scheduled for 28 June of the same year. At the end of 2009, the 
European Commission presented Albania with a questionnaire to assess the country’s 
application to join the EU. “The questions relate to all segments of the European legal 
framework and the Copenhagen criteria for EU membership. The questionnaire attaches 
particular importance to the political criteria. Good governance, the rule of law, judiciary 
reform, the fight against corruption, media freedom—these are all key issues which will 
form the core of our assessment.”183 
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Although Albania appears to be determined on the path towards integration into 
the European Union, the length of this path will depend on the seriousness and 
commitment of the Albanian political elites and of Albanian society to accomplish the 
political and economic reforms that are fundamental conditions for membership. For the 
Albanian people, EU membership is as much a question of beliefs about their identity and 
culture as it is an issue of geopolitical and economic interest and development. 
B. EU: PROMOTING DEMOCRACY THROUGH CONDITIONALITY 
The European Union is considered the most successful international actor for the 
promotion of democracy in post-communist countries. Since the collapse of the 
communist system in Eastern Europe, democracy promotion has remained one of the 
main elements of EU foreign policy, having contributed significantly to the 
democratization process in these countries. “The attractiveness of EU membership and 
the strict political conditionality attached to the accession process have vested the EU 
with considerable transformative power in the applicant countries.”184 In addition to 
political changes, the conditionality of the accession process has also “triggered 
fundamental changes in the CEE [Central and Eastern European] countries,”185 which 
consider membership in the EU both as the finalization of their transition process and a 
significant demonstration of their new status in the international arena. In that regard, the 
EU is seen “as the most important institution to join, both because of the practical 
benefits of membership and also because of what it represents.”186 Furthermore, 
accession to a unique international organization such as the EU “fulfils the needs of 
identification and legitimation. Being accepted as a member of an ‘aspiration group’ of 
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like-minded or ‘model’ countries assures governments and societies of their identity and 
of the legitimacy of their political and social values.”187 
Karen E. Smith describes political conditionality as a mechanism that “entails the 
linking, by a state or international organization, of perceived benefits to another state 
(such as aid, trade concessions, cooperation agreements, political contacts, or 
international organization membership), to the fulfillment of conditions relating to the 
protection of human rights and advancement of democratic principles.”188 Any European 
country seeking membership in the EU must conform to the conditions and principles 
expressed in Article 6 (1) of the Treaty on European Union. In order to join the EU, a 
candidate country must meet three criteria:  
• Political: stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, 
human rights and respect for and protection of minorities;  
• Economic: existence of a functioning market economy and the capacity to 
cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union; [and] 
• Acceptance of the Community acquis: ability to take on the obligations of 
membership, including adherence to the aims of political, economic and 
monetary union.189  
Although the Copenhagen European Council in June 1993 did not prioritize these 
conditions, the Helsinki European Council in December 1999 set democracy as the main 
prerequisite for beginning negotiations. The Copenhagen criteria are a form of 
conditionality that not only serve to protect the EU, but also constitute a powerful foreign 
policy mechanism affecting applicant countries’ domestic and foreign policies and 
making them do things they otherwise might not do. As Karen E. Smith argues, they “are 
the EU’s most powerful instrument for influencing the transformation of Eastern 
Europe.”190 By using conditionality, the EU considers “the adoption of democratic rules 
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and practices as conditions that target countries have to fulfill in order to receive rewards 
such as financial assistance, some kind of contractual association, or—ultimately—
membership.”191 
The membership of several Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries in the 
EU and the perspective of membership for the countries of the Western Balkans show 
that conditions for accession function as an effective leverage for the democratization 
process in these countries. This confirms the accuracy of the Madrid European Council 
declaration that “enlargement is both a political necessity and a historic opportunity for 
Europe. It will ensure the stability and security of the continent and will thus offer both 
the applicant States and the current members of the Union new prospects for economic 
growth and general well-being.”192  
Conditionality of membership has enabled the EU to exercise significant 
influence in countries of this region, through intensifying accession and association 
activities oriented toward “preparing them for potential membership.”193 This process, as 
Emilian Kavalski argues, “has allowed the EU to demand compliance from Balkan state-
elites through the ‘sticks and carrots’ of its membership project or the threat of exclusion 
from its benefits.”194  The conditionality mechanism has not only increased the role of 
the EU in the region, but has also promoted regional cooperation. This has inspired hope 
that full membership “will finally lay to rest some of the most intractable conflicts of the 
19th and 20th centuries.”195  
Nevertheless, as Olli Rehn, the former EU Commissioner for enlargement, has 
underlined, “the enlargement of the EU has always been driven by the principle of 
individual merits and according to the efforts of each candidate state.”196 In other words, 
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each candidate state must establish a good record of complying with the Copenhagen 
criteria, a process that requires a deep transformation of the country’s laws, institutions, 
policies and orientations. The process of joining the EU “is much more difficult and 
complex than is [that of] joining NATO, which essentially requires political commitment 
and changes to the armed forces.”197 The EU’s conditionality policy has also induced a 
race among candidate countries to move forward, thus creating a competitive 
environment. This has encouraged candidate states, particularly those sharing the same 
past, to meet compliance requirements to maintain their place in the accession queue. All 
candidate countries are subject to the same requirements, and each country’s “place in the 
membership queue has corresponded to the progress it has made toward fulfilling the 
EU’s requirements.”198 On the other hand, the evaluation process is based on merit, using 
the same standards for all applicant countries. 
However, according to Heather Grabbe, “although the conditions seem 
straightforward, analyzing them is problematic because their interpretation is complex 
and what would count as meeting them is opaque.”199 She argues that the Copenhagen 
conditions “are very broad and open to considerable interpretation; elaboration of what 
constitutes meeting them has progressively widened the detailed criteria for membership, 
making the Union a moving target for applicants.”200 In spite of that, there is a general 
consensus that reforms and democratic changes in CEE countries have been impressive. 
In that context, “the European Union has shaped almost every area of domestic policy-
making in candidate and aspiring countries,”201 thus, making democracy promotion 
through enlargement a significant and attractive strategy of democratization. Shortly after 
the collapse of the communist regimes, EU membership became an issue of national 
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interest, for all the countries of CEE, because it offered substantial geopolitical, socio-
cultural and economic benefits, including the protection of EU rules for weak states. 
Albania and the other countries of the Western Balkans are today at the center of 
the EU’s enlargement process. The prospect of accession to the EU by these countries is 
expected to provide for the stabilization and revitalization of the region. For that purpose, 
political elites in these countries “are responding to EU leverage by adopting political and 
economic agendas that are compatible with the state’s bid for EU membership.”202 
However, as Milada Anna Vachudova argues, there is a need for adjusting EU leverage 
for the Western Balkans, and a reconsideration of the EU strategy concerning these 
countries, because they “need a more dynamic and far-reaching EU strategy that brings 
more attention and greater resources to bear on supporting positive changes in politics, 
the economy and society.”203 Many have debated about how effective conditionality is in 
achieving compliance and promoting certain policies on the part of aspirant countries.  
Frank Schimmelfennig is of the view that, although “European regional organizations 
have used a variety of strategies and instruments, only the high material and political 
rewards of membership in the European Union (EU) . . . have triggered sustained 
domestic change”204 in the countries of CEE. Contrary to the accession conditionality of 
membership, “which consists in a positive strategy of reinforcement by reward,”205 
normative suasion and social influence have not been effective. Although the EU offers 
material and political rewards in return for norm compliance, it does not coerce non-
compliant governments. However, the reward (that is, membership) is withheld. The 
graded integration process, the association and stabilization process, the candidate status, 
and finally full membership serve as mechanisms for the EU to assess compliance and the 
progress made by the aspirant countries.  
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Finally, conditionality “has been like a balance between progress and meeting 
conditions, imposing rigorous checks on the process, but providing appropriate assistance 
and due rewards for the progress.”206 EU enlargement has proved to be a powerful and 
successful tool of EU foreign policy, “and with greater attention and resources, it will 
help usher in a period of democratic stability and economic revitalization in the Western 
Balkans.”207    
C. ALBANIA AND THE EU:   AID AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE  
The transformation in Albania faced particular difficulties related to the 
introduction of democracy and a market economy. Like the other eastern European 
countries, Albania experienced a transition from a centralized to a free market economy. 
This transition required significant institutional changes, large-scale privatizations, 
clearly defined property rights, and the establishment of institutions that enhanced market 
exchange. Immediately after the collapse of communism, the country faced economic 
collapse, social disorder and widespread emigration.  
Following the example of other former communist countries, Albania turned, 
among other organizations, to the EU for financial help and assistance related to political 
and economic reforms. From that perspective, the role of the EU was significant for an 
economically backward country like Albania. Furthermore, membership in international 
organizations and institutions, like the CSCE, the Council of Europe, the IMF and the 
World Bank, and the intensification of relations “indicate that it [Albania] was attempting 
to integrate itself quite rapidly into the international system.”208 EU–Albania relations 
date back to 1991, when the EU, in a sign of encouragement to political reforms and 
economic transformation, included Albania in the PHARE assistance program, a 
“European Union initiative which supports the development of a larger democratic family 
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of nations within a prosperous and stable Europe.”209 This was the main channel for the 
EU’s financial and technical support for Albania, and the main financial instrument of the 
pre-accession strategy for Albania as with other CEE countries that have applied for 
membership in the European Union.  
Receiving funds through the PHARE program helped the country facilitate and 
support domestic transition efforts. According to Geoffrey Pridham, “The PHARE 
programme aimed to strengthen administrative structures through helping with reform 
strategies and training civil servants and offered various projects for institutional 
development and learning managerial techniques.”210 Although directed to assist market 
reforms and restructuring of the economy, the PHARE program was also designed to 
support “Albania’s ambition to develop further relations with the European Union.”211 
The inclusion of Albania in the PHARE program placed the EU “in an 
extraordinary position of influence.”212 Although it was intended primarily to support the 
economic transformation of Albania, “its objective [was], in the end, political: in doing 
so, it will help establish democratic societies based on individual rights.”213 Only a year 
later, EU–Albania relations were upgraded with the signing of the Trade and Cooperation 
Agreement (TCA) and the initiation of a political dialogue. The initial stage of EU 
assistance, which covered the period from 1991 to 1997, was mainly focused on 
emergency and food aid. However, support to the economic reform process was another 
important area in which EU grants were allocated. In the following years, Albania was 
able to strengthen its position as a PHARE established partner. The focus of PHARE  
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support turned, over time, to the “country’s market reforms and the medium-term 
restructuring and modernisation of the Albanian economy as well as strengthening of 
links with the European Union.”214   
The level of economic development of a democratizing country has a 
considerable impact on whether the democracy it builds can sustain itself over time. 
Viewed from this perspective, the 1992 TCA not only constituted an act regulating trade 
and economic relations, but also “was an essential document that would pave the way for 
a closer relationship based on the principles of consolidated democracies and eventually 
for the achievement of Albania’s goal, EU membership.”215 The preamble of the 
agreement, while emphasizing the importance of the trade and economic relationship 
between the Community and Albania, provided that “contractual links . . . will contribute 
to progress towards the objective of an association agreement in due course, when 
conditions are met, and to further development of relations between them.”216 
In 1995, Albania submitted a request to open negotiations for an association 
agreement, which would establish an association between Albania and the EU and its 
member states. The General Affairs Council conclusions of 13 May 1996 indicated that 
such an agreement to open negotiations would constitute an important step towards an 
association agreement. However, subsequent events related to the parliamentary elections 
of 26 May 1996, which failed to meet international standards, and the crisis of 1997 
caused by the collapse of the pyramid schemes, prevented the European Commission 
from issuing formal recommendations.  A report of the Commission of European 
Communities (EC) on the feasibility of negotiating a Stabilisation and Association 
Agreement (SAA) with Albania, addressing the domestic political situation, stated that:  
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Albania remains marked by important economic, political and institutional 
weaknesses, which do not facilitate the perspective of an association with 
EC and its member states. At least in parallel to the opening of 
negotiations, if not before, the country must do its utmost to address these 
weaknesses. In particular, credible commitments and a timetable for action 
are necessary . . . for a successful participation of the country in the 
Stabilisation and Association Process and prerequisites for the upgrading 
of contractual relations towards an association with EC and its Member 
States.217  
Therefore, negotiations for a new agreement with Albania would take into 
account the political and economic reality of the country. In such circumstances, in order 
to reach sustainable stabilization and normalization, the European Commission invited 
the Albanian government to take concrete steps in the main areas of concern, such as: 
• macro-economic stabilization and accelerated structural reforms; 
• strengthening of security and public order; and 
• improvement of governance and strengthening of law enforcement. 
In addition, institutional stability, governance, the functioning of the state’s 
administration and the rule of law, as well as the general weakness of the economy due to 
its dependence on foreign aid, were considered the “basic problems which, at least, 
hamper a full association with the EC and its Member States.”218 It is obvious that 
Albanian political elites did not take advantage of the economic assistance offered by the 
EU to further advance their national political goals, that is, association with the EU 
through a new contractual relationship. The events of 1996 and 1997 extended their 
negative impact in the following years, although the EU continued to encourage Albanian 
leaders in their commitment to stabilize the situation and move forward.  EU assistance 
was then adapted to respond to the new needs of the country and the evolving political 
situation.  
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Following the institutional and economic instability triggered by the collapse of 
the pyramid schemes, the EU had to reassess its strategy and focused on a number of 
priority areas, like “restoring and developing governance and promoting civil society; 
designing and implementing sound economic and social policies; and reviving economic 
activity.”219 These priorities were also set in a wider regional context, based on the new 
regional approach for southeastern European countries.  
In 2001, Albania became eligible for CARDS assistance funds. According to the 
European Commission, “The EU’s CARDS (Community Assistance for Reconstruction, 
Development and Stabilisation) programme brings a more strategic approach to 
assistance to the Stabilisation and Association Process countries. . . . As each country 
moves deeper into the Stabilisation and Association Process, assistance focuses 
increasingly on support for developing government institutions and legislation, and 
approximation with European norms and eventually harmonisation with EU acquis (EU 
law).”220 While assistance under PHARE was, among other areas, focused on sectors 
such as rehabilitating basic infrastructure, transport, agriculture, energy and 
telecommunications, the CARDS program included support for “democratic 
stabilisation” and was primarily “adjusted to fit the new requirements, and to support 
areas that would be of major importance for implementing a future SAA.”221  
In contrast with the PHARE program, which was demand-driven, the initiation of 
the CARDS program marked a significant shift to an accession-driven approach, allowing 
the EU to support activities in important areas that would enhance the future integration 
process. In conclusion, the EU’s aid and assistance to Albania have been adapted to 
respond to the needs of the political and economic situation in the country. The EU 
contributions have moved from emergency assistance to rebuilding infrastructure, from 
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economic recovery to developing government institutions, legislation and social 
development, and from reinforcing democracy and the rule of law to promoting regional 
cooperation. 
D. STABILIZATION AND ASSOCIATION AGREEMENT 
The SAA represents the EU soft-power mechanism of political conditionality. 
Justice and domestic affairs are of critical importance to the SAA, thereby forming the 
main component of conditionality for the candidate status of states seeking membership 
in the EU. As a result of the events in the Western Balkans in 1999, “the role of the EU in 
the Balkans altered qualitatively.”222 These events, particularly the Kosovo crisis, made 
the EU consider a regional approach in order to contribute to peace and prosperity in the 
region. In May 1999, the EU proposed a Stabilization and Association Process (SAP) for 
the Western Balkan countries, which was “a historic turning point in the relations 
between the Western Balkan countries and the EU as a prospect of EU integration was 
thereby offered.”223 In the same year, a report by the Commission of the European 
Communities, on the feasibility of negotiating an SAA with Albania, marked a new phase 
in Albania’s commitment to a closer relationship with the European Union. 
The opening of negotiations for a new agreement was conditioned on the 
improvement of political and economic conditions in the country. Furthermore, the 
Commission “invite[d] the Albanian government to give a status report, including a 
timetable, on actions taken or envisaged in priority areas,”224 such as macro-economic 
stabilization, the strengthening of security and public order, and further improvement of 
governance and law enforcement. Significant improvements in the above areas were set 
as prerequisites for the successful participation of Albania in the SAP. The EU message 
for the Albanian elites was clear: progress in compliance with democratic principles,  
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market economy practices, and the rule of law would bring the country closer to 
membership in the European Union. Meeting EU obligations required the demonstration 
of sufficient administrative capacity and political will. 
By providing a list of obligations to be carried out by the Albanian government, 
the report marked the launching of a conditionality approach in relations between the EU 
and Albania. Therefore, the period since 1999 “has been decisive for Albania’s closer 
integration into European structures.”225 The new constitution, approved in 1998, 
provided the basis for the advancement of legal reforms, the consolidation of democratic 
institutions and achieving the standards of a functioning democracy. In that regard, “the 
EU appears to be largely perceived as the most important strategic partner for the 
country,”226 and is strongly supported by political elites both in government and 
opposition.  
The Zagreb Summit of November 2000 further reinforced the EU commitment 
towards an Association Agreement (AA) with Albania by establishing an EU-Albania 
High Level Steering Group (HLSG) “with the objective of stepping up co-operation 
between the EU and Albania, and identifying and supporting the reforms to be carried out 
by Albania in preparation for the negotiation of a Stabilisation and Association 
Agreement.”227 Evaluating the post-1997 developments in Albania, including the major 
efforts to restore order and reform economic and social life, the HLSG recommended the 
perspective of opening SAA negotiations “as the best way of helping to maintain the 
momentum of recent political and economic reform, and of encouraging Albania to 
continue its constructive and moderating influence in the region.”228 According to the 
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HLSG report, the main difficulties reside in the functioning of the judiciary, widespread 
corruption, a large gray economy, and lack of capacity to implement laws. In addition, an 
EU-Albania Consultative Task Force (CTF) was established in order to prepare the 
negotiations of the SAA with Albania.  
Increased political instability followed the parliamentary elections of 2001, 
sharpening tensions between the government and the opposition over the election results. 
These tensions abated after the election of a consensual president in 2002, but they had an 
impact in slowing the pace of reforms. At this time, Albanian elites focused their 
attention on internal political disputes and “short term interests of political leaders had 
occasionally prevailed over the strategic vision of continued rapprochement to 
Europe.”229 As a result, “the influence of EU conditionality on the Albanian reform 
processes and particularly on the commitment of the ruling political coalition was during 
this period at quite low levels.”230 As long as integration is a two-way process, successful 
application of conditionality “is, however, to a significant degree dependent on the 
responsiveness of domestic actors, with their European commitment being the decisive 
factor.”231 Nevertheless, the EU continued to appeal to the Albanian political elites to 
guarantee a stable political environment with fully functioning democratic institutions as 
the only way to make further progress towards an SAP.  
Negotiations for an SAA with Albania were officially opened on 31 January 
2003. The commitment of the Albanian government to move political and economic 
reforms forward was critical for the progress of the negotiations. In order for the member 
states to monitor the negotiation process, the European Commission was provided with a 
specific mandate that allowed the continuation of the CTF meetings including the 
member states’ representatives. While this has not been the case with Croatia and the 
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, “continuation of the CTF was seen as an 
important instrument to maintain a platform for discussing and monitoring Albania’s 
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general reform progress, e.g., regarding the development of democratic institutions and 
rule of law.”232 The conclusion of the negotiations strongly demanded the acceleration of 
reforms. In particular, the reform efforts should concentrate on the following areas:  
preserving political stability, reinforcing democracy and ensuring free and 
fair electoral processes, improving the upholding of human and minority 
rights, intensifying the fight against fraud, corruption, organised crime and 
trafficking, substantially increasing implementation and enforcement 
capacities (notably through an enhanced public administration and 
judiciary), reinforcing the structures directly involved in the 
implementation of a future SAA as well as those responsible for 
implementing international financial assistance, improving fiscal 
sustainability, completing the privatisation process in all strategic sectors, 
properly addressing the energy crisis, resolving the land property-related 
issues and developing an efficient land market.233 
The accomplishment of these reforms would remain a precondition for the 
conclusion of the SAA. While the EU has continuously stressed the importance of 
reforms, the Albanian political elites did not seem to be on the same wave length, 
regardless of their statements that progress in SAP is a top priority. Concrete results have 
fallen short of EU expectations. Beyond declarations, the government was expected to 
demonstrate, through its actions, the necessary determination to address the key reforms. 
Although the perspective of integration is usually perceived as a strong leverage to 
induce reforms, this does not seem to be the case with Albania. Judith Hoffman argues 
that the slow pace of reforms is related to three main factors. First, the establishment of a 
Free Trade Area with the EU, in the long run, will diminish the custom revenues for 
Albania. Second, “the Albanian governing elites as a political actor with short term 
interests can not see the immediate benefits of compliance with EU conditions since the 
EU membership still has a long way to go.”234 Third, the internal political instability has 
shifted the political interest from EU integration issues to the struggle for power between 
the majority and the opposition. 
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However, the EU conditionality and the integration-oriented perspective of the 
EU’s relations with Albania were of significant importance for the progress achieved in 
the 2005 elections to the National Assembly. Progress in these elections was also 
influenced by the “internal pressure by the opposition and more importantly, by the 
general public and the civil society structures that made clear that this was the last chance 
for Albania to change attitude and start addressing pressing concerns and thus move 
forward in the integration process.”235 By this time, increasing internal pressure by civil 
society groups and other non-political actors was a clear indicator of the impact of the EU 
conditionality mechanisms, which in the context of the SA process “are far more 
developed and efficient than the previous period.”236  
A new stage in Albania-EU relations was confirmed by the signing of the 
Stabilisation and Association Agreement on 12 June 2006, which provided not only for a 
clearer membership perspective than before, but also for a new context for the 
implementation of long-term reforms, particularly the incorporation of the EU’s acquis 
communautaire into domestic law. The signing of the SAA represents the most important 
step on Albania’s path towards EU membership, and it is extremely important for 
Albania’s future and its EU perspective. Its successful implementation is of significant 
importance before further formal steps towards EU membership can be considered. On 
12 June 2006, Albania entered “into a more advanced phase in its relationship with the 
EU, which implies increased responsibilities.”237 By adopting a National Strategy for 
Development and Integration (NSDI), the new government238 established a strategic and 
operational framework which should help in the fulfillment of its SAA reform 
commitments.  
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E. EU: IMPACT ON DOMESTIC REFORMS 
Following the opening of negotiations with the European Commission on an 
SAA, and taking into account the new stage of relations with the EU, the newly 
established Ministry of European Integration (MEI) was tasked with the overall 
coordination of Albania’s EU integration process. The MEI undertook revisions in 
legislation, the formulation of integration policies, and the coordination of financial 
assistance and public information. As in other aspirant countries, one relevant feature was 
“the appointment to influential positions in European policy of younger personnel, given 
they are less likely to be tainted with the Communist experience and generally show a 
greater facility with foreign languages.”239 
Increased interaction and involvement with the EU have affected internal 
restructuring and have promoted greater participation and influence by non-political 
actors, civil society and business in the decision-making process in the country. To 
respond to the EU’s call for increased attention to good governance, the rule of law and 
effective public administration, the Berisha government restructured government 
institutions, thus providing for more interministerial cooperation, and made “some 
progress in strengthening its government structures to address its commitments towards 
the EU and the broader development agenda.”240 Policy and strategy functions have been 
given greater prominence in ministries. In addition, the elaboration of sector strategies, 
under the national strategy for development and integration, was carried out in a 
transparent and open manner. The civil registry and the national address system are being 
strengthened. In parallel, electronic identification cards and biometric passports are being 
developed. However, the 2009 EU progress report expressed concern about the tendency 
of the government to exert control over independent institutions, in particular the 
judiciary. 
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Parliament has further consolidated its role as a forum for political debate. The 
establishment of the European integration committee added to the Euro-focused 
institutionalization of efforts at the parliamentary level.  A considerable number of laws 
have been passed to revise the Albanian legislation in accordance with the EU acquis, 
although this legal process continues to remain the main challenge. However, the role of 
Parliament in monitoring the implementation of SAA obligations remains weak, and “the 
level of expertise available to parliament had an adverse effect on the quality of EU-
related legislation.”241 The demands of the European integration process “have also 
impacted on executive-parliament relations and acted to empower the former at the 
expense of the latter.”242 Further progress on EU–relevant legislation requires the 
parliament “to strengthen administrative capacities to perform its control functions over 
the legislative process.”243 The entry into force of the SAA, in April 2009, was not 
matched by a strengthening of administrative capacity to monitor SAA commitments.  
Overall, the public administration is stabilizing and becoming somewhat more 
focused. In order to attract Albanian graduates of foreign universities, the government has 
changed the civil service recruitment process. The Civil Service law also provides for the 
participation of minorities in the public administration, the army and the police. 
However, with the legal framework for public administration reform in place “the lack of 
transparency and accountability in appointments remains a key European Partnership 
priority to be addressed.”244 Professionalizing the public administration and adapting its 
institutional structures to SAA-related demands remain challenges for the future.  
Although the government has approved a new anti-corruption strategy, including 
anti-corruption agencies and legislation, and continues to address the struggle against 
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corruption as a key European Union partnership priority, “corruption is widespread and 
constitutes a very serious problem in Albania.”245 While Albania showed notable 
improvement in the fight against corruption in 2008, there was regression in 2009. 
According to Transparency International, “Albania marks 3.2 points in the annual 
Corruption Perception Index for 2009, from 3.4 that was in 2008.”246 The challenge of 
fighting corruption requires, first of all, functioning societal and governmental 
institutions. Failure to properly address this issue “raises the potential for deeper 
disillusionment with the political class, with possible implications for democratic 
consolidation.”247 
Despite the progress achieved, judicial reform in Albania remains at an early 
stage, and the “justice system continues to function poorly due to shortcomings in 
independence, transparency and efficiency, which are key European priorities to be 
addressed.”248 Given the importance of the justice system, as one of the primary vehicles 
for encouraging the rule of law, “Albania’s journey toward EU membership is therefore 
closely associated with if not dependent on the nature of changes to emerge within the 
judicial system.”249 In addition to problems pertaining to independence, transparency and 
professionalism, the “separation of powers between the legislative, executive and 
judiciary is fragile and intermittently damaged by jurisdictional arguments and conflicts 
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over constitutional interpretation. The judiciary’s independence has been repeatedly 
jeopardized by arbitrary interference from politicians of both the government and the 
opposition.”250 Albania has nonetheless received considerable international rule-of-law 
assistance. Judicial reform is one of the primary political conditions, “for it is 
fundamental to the rule of law which is central to the functioning of liberal 
democracies.”251 
With respect to human rights and minorities, Albania has ratified most of the 
international human rights instruments, and has an adequate body of legislation that 
guarantees the promotion and enforcement of human rights. Still, much more is required 
to be done to enforce the existing legislation, particularly with regard to torture and ill 
treatment, gender equality, child protection and discrimination. 
The number and substantive quality of bilateral activities are indications of 
Albania’s continuing commitment to maintaining positive relations with neighboring 
countries and EU member states. “Regional cooperation and good neighbourly relations 
form an essential part of the process of moving towards the European Union.”252 Albania 
is also active in regional initiatives, including the South-East European Cooperation 
Process (SEECP), the Regional Cooperation Council (RCC), the Central European Free 
Trade Agreement (CEFTA), the Energy Community Treaty (ECT) and the European 
Common Aviation Area Agreement (ECAAA). 
The European Council in Copenhagen in June 1993 stated that membership in the 
European Union requires the existence of a functioning market economy and the capacity 
to cope with competitive pressures and market forces within the European Union. From 
that perspective, it is noteworthy that the Albanian economy continues to expand. It 
“recorded strong and sustained growth of 8 percent in 2008 and, according to the 
authorities’ data, of 6 percent in the first quarter of 2009, mainly driven by large public 
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investments in the road network.”253 The EU remained the main trading partner of 
Albania in 2008, and trade with CEFTA countries increased. 
Annual reports by the European Commission on the progress made towards the 
accomplishment of EU commitments by Albania have served to mobilize support for 
specified reforms within the government and general public. Because European 
integration has become a priority issue, these reports have received special attention from 
the Albanian political elites and the media. In that regard, these reports “have become a 
powerful instrument for redistribution of political information in favor of mobilization of 
support for EU-recommended action.”254 Furthermore, these reports have been used to 
identify future priorities for all government institutions and have inspired domestic 
competition among political elites, thus making EU evaluation on the progress of reforms 
increasingly influential.  
The influence of the European Union through a combination of the stick (via the 
progress reports) and the carrot (through the perspective of membership) has been 
decisive in spurring the Albanian government into action, although sometimes the 
implementation of EU recommendations has been comparatively slow.  
F. FUTURE EU PERSPECTIVE FOR ALBANIA 
Immediately after joining NATO on 1 April 2009, Albania submitted its formal 
application for membership in the EU, which remains the primary future geopolitical 
orientation for the country. The Council of the EU has invited the European Commission 
to submit its opinion on Albania’s application for membership. The opinion will 
constitute a comprehensive analysis of the country's capacity to meet the criteria for 
membership in the EU. The submission date for this opinion has not yet been established. 
When will Albania join the EU? This question has been raised frequently, not 
only by the general public, but also by political elites. The EU stands by the commitment 
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expressed at the Thessaloniki Summit that “The future of the Balkans is within the 
European Union.”255 At the same time, however, the European Commission has stated 
that “the EU must equally stand by the conditions which must be met [by Albania] in 
order to move towards the EU.”256 While the accession criteria are the same for all 
countries aspiring to become EU members, the response to the timing question rests on 
the commitment of the Albanian political elites and public “to establish a sustained 
record of successful implementation of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement.”257 
As mentioned earlier, the evaluation process is based on merit, using the same standards 
for all applicant countries. From that perspective, the outcome depends on the other side 
in the interactive dynamics of EU accession, particularly the domestic politics of Albania 
as an aspirant country. Hence, “it is not the date but the progress to meet the requirements 
that matters most.”258  
Albania is now at a stage in which government efforts are focused on the 
successful implementation of the SAA, and on the content of European Union- relevant 
legislation. At this point, political stability is “crucial both in convincing Brussels of an 
applicant country’s good intentions but also in terms of the domestic dynamic that helps 
to drive the accession forward.”259 The Albanian government should, therefore, take 
advantage of the high level of public support for the EU and maintain a political 
consensus behind its European integration policies.   
Shortly after the elections to the National Assembly in June 2009, the country 
experienced another political crisis. The Socialist Party (SP), which won 65 of 140 seats 
in Parliament, has been boycotting the Assembly since September 2009, claiming that the 
elections were manipulated. The SP boycott has paralyzed the adoption of the EU- 
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required laws. Given the significant importance of the EU’s political criteria, the 
parliamentary boycott “would have a negative impact on the analysis of the political 
criteria and thus have negative ramifications on the chances of being granted candidate 
status by the European Union.”260  
While the country has gradually moved toward democratic consolidation, internal 
political struggle and “the absence of parliamentary dialogue and recourse to boycotts, 
especially following election results, is a recurrent problem in Albania which seriously 
hampers the democratic functioning of the state’s institutions.”261 The political crisis has 
endangered the country’s EU accession efforts, and “its application to join the EU is in 
jeopardy unless a damaging political crisis is resolved.”262 This is why the EU member 
countries’ diplomats urged the main political parties to reach a compromise. According to 
the Spanish Ambassador to Tirana, “the EU perspective for Albania is at stake.”263 
There is a general consensus that the integration of Albania into EU structures 
requires significant reforms in most policy areas related to democratic governance, 
particularly ensuring the stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, 
human rights and the protection of minorities, and the development of a market economy. 
The perspective of future EU membership serves as an incentive for reform. Therefore, it 
is important for Albanian elites “to understand that they have to carry out wide-ranging 
reforms not because the EU asks them to do so, but because they have to do so to address 
the needs of the citizens, to raise their living standards.”264  
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An important step in the short term would be meeting the requirements for the 
lifting of visas that would enable Albanian citizens to travel freely to EU member states. 
This is a process that requires tangible reforms in areas such as document security, illegal 
migration, public order and security. The speed of movement toward visa liberalization 
will depend on the progress achieved to meet the requirements set. Visa liberalization 
will enhance business and cultural cooperation between Albania and the EU, thus moving 
the country a step closer to EU membership.  
In addition to the support of external actors, the delivery of EU-oriented reforms 
is “the responsibility of the domestic actors, in particular the politicians.”265 Because 
integration is a complex process with institutional and policy dimensions, “elite 
understanding is quite vital in directing a country’s accession.”266 In that regard, it is 
important for Albania “to ensure that reforms are not only EU compatible but also that, at 
the same time, they address particular needs of the country that legislation is enforceable, 
[and] that institutions required to implement these reforms are consolidated.”267  
The EU perspective for Albania is the final confirmation of the “four 
imperatives,”268 which are crucial to its external policy redirection. EU membership—in 
other words, the return to Europe—is first a historical imperative which allows the 
country to leave behind the painful transition period “and to seek a brighter future within 
the European integration.”269 While membership in the EU is the most profitable choice 
for stable economic development and building a democratic and orderly society, there is a 
common perception among Albanian political elites and civil society groups that EU 
membership is central to the “process of democratization if not crucial to its successful 
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outcome.”270 Thus, it is a democratic imperative. This is why for the Albanian 
government, European Union membership “represents a main national priority.”271  
EU membership for a small NATO member country like Albania will constitute 
the final step towards Euro-Atlantic integration. Joining the EU offers Albania a broader 
sense of security, “including ‘soft’ security matters . . . such as in relation to questions of 
justice and home affairs.”272 It will also provide for a stronger commitment, by the EU, 
of political solidarity to Albania as a new member, which is “seen widely as a de facto 
form of security guarantee.”273 Not less important is the modernizing and economic 
imperative. In general, modernization is associated with economic development and 
prosperity, and with the further opportunities offered by European integration. EU 
membership will not only speed up Albania’s development, it will also offer better access 
to markets and trade development, encourage foreign investment, and provide for a 
“greater sense of economic certainty and a reinforcement of the practices of the market 
economy.”274 Sustaining a functioning market economy, with the capacity to cope with 
competitive pressure and market forces within the European Union, is one of the 
Copenhagen criteria. While Albania has already embarked on marketization, the 
dynamics of EU integration will provide “a strong pressure to speed up this change.”275 
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leverage over Albania, “a crucial factor was [and remains] the commitment and will of 
governments there over joining the EU and staying the course of membership 
negotiations.”276 
The whole EU integration process requires deep structural and institutional 
reforms, particularly related to democratic governance, the rule of law and the fight 
against corruption, human rights and the further development of a market economy. This 
process should encourage and promote democratic consolidation, and must be used to 
achieve genuine progress. The achievement of these reforms will take time. Strong public 
support and cross-party consensus over EU integration, along with the four imperatives 
addressed above, are a compelling motivation for the Albanian governing elites to speed 
up the EU integration process. The neighboring countries are moving fast in that 
direction. After almost twenty years since the collapse of the communist regime, Albania 
has no time to lose.  
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V. CONCLUSIONS 
Since the collapse of communism, the policy agenda of Albanian political elites 
has been strongly influenced by the desire to join international organizations. Following a 
long period of extreme isolation, membership in these organizations would offer Albania 
a new place in the international arena. The change of regime was accompanied by an 
influx of international actors and organizations offering to assist the Albanian 
government and society in their transition away from communism. As noted in this 
thesis, bilateral assistance was provided mostly by Western European states and the 
United States, and by international organizations such as the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund, which (in addition to emergency financial assistance) 
provided support for democracy promotion, which “is now one of the leading 
international ‘industries.’”277 
The post-communist Albanian elites declared “return to Europe” as their first 
foreign policy priority. Therefore, they increasingly focused their efforts on satisfying the 
requirements of accession to the main Euro-Atlantic international organizations, 
particularly the OSCE, NATO, and most recently the EU. These three organizations 
became the dominant sources of assistance and support driving policy changes in the 
country. They have accordingly played a significant role in the post-communist transition 
of Albania. Regardless of the diverse methods, instruments and resources they use, they 
share the same objective: to help promote democracy, stability and security. While 
Albania became an OSCE participating state as early as 1992, NATO and the EU 
identified democracy development as a precondition for joining their ranks in the future, 
thus applying, as with other eastern European countries, a policy of conditionality by 
establishing a direct linkage between membership and democracy.  
Political elites in Albania supported the NATO and EU policies of conditionality, 
as they believed that Western democracy was the only and best choice for Albania. 
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However, the process of obtaining NATO membership took longer than anticipated, and 
the EU accession process is a political project not yet completed, although it represents 
the European Union’s most powerful leverage on Albania as an applicant country. By 
giving top priority to democracy promotion, as the embodiment of economic and political 
success, the EU has already become the main pole of attraction for Albania. In many 
respects the EU’s conditionality differs from that of other multinational organizations. 
Although EU demands are reinforced by extensive monitoring, the membership incentive 
has provided the vehicle for a strong external influence on the path of democratization.  
Albania has made remarkable progress in its transition to a market economy and a 
liberal democracy. This progress owes a lot to the influence and support of Western 
governments and Euro-Atlantic organizations. Pursuing membership in these 
organizations has formed the cornerstone of the foreign policy of successive Albanian 
governments, which have sought to establish the West as the final destination of their 
democratic projects. Meeting membership criteria, particularly with NATO and the EU, 
has increasingly shaped policy choices during the past two decades, and this has 
accelerated the democratization process of the country.  
While the CSCE’s conditionality for participation was not highly exigent, 
Albania’s early participation in this organization proved to be an effective mechanism in 
influencing future democracy developments. In an international context, the CSCE 
process was essentially important, and “the ideological warfare that the West pursued 
throughout the years of communism did play an important role in de-legitimizing the 
communist system.”278 In a national context, by putting a strong emphasis on the human 
rights dimension, the CSCE played an important role in encouraging the opposition 
movement in Albania. In addition, participation in the OSCE and other international 
organizations, including the Council of Europe, the International Monetary Fund and the 
World Bank, opened the country to the socializing influences of international actors that 
supported the process of building democratic institutions and carrying out fundamental 
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reforms in preparation for NATO membership and, in the near future, EU membership. In 
particular, cooperation with the OSCE was important for Albania because “it grants the 
stamp of international recognition to countries that carry out fair and free elections and 
strictly observe other democratic procedures.”279 Membership in these organizations has 
long been considered a gateway to wider European integration. 
Although the importance of domestic political actors for democracy building 
cannot be ignored, this thesis has addressed the role played by international organizations 
in creating an environment conducive to democratic reform, thereby helping the 
democratization process in Albania. “Linking membership of Western institutions to 
democracy and other reforms has been a characteristic feature of the crafting effort.”280 
Many have debated the importance of historical legacies in countries undergoing 
democratic transitions. In that regard, it is impossible to explain democratic 
developments in Albania without referring to the long communist legacy, because 
Albania suffered under one of the harshest dictatorships in Eastern Europe and was one 
of the most isolated countries in Europe.  Hence, Albania was “too inexperienced and too 
fragile to be able to cope effectively with the unexpected and powerful impact of 
globalization.”281 This is why cooperation with international organizations was the only 
choice for Albania to “return to Europe” after 45 years of communist rule. However, the 
historical legacy and influence affected both the transition and the democratic 
consolidation process in Albania. 
International organizations have shaped domestic politics in Albania, but the 
question remains: how much impact have they had? This is an issue of the extent to 
which domestic politics in Albania converged with the prescriptions of Euro-Atlantic 
international institutions, and the effect of conditionality in determining from outside the 
course of domestic reforms. The thesis concludes that, although there has been a large 
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degree of convergence, there have also been periods of divergence in the policies 
pursued. Jan Zielonka observes that “the overall capacity of state institutions to cope with 
these [internal and external] pressures ultimately determined the balance between the 
impact of policies and processes. In Albania the state was extremely weak and thus fell 
prey to both external and internal processes beyond its control.”282 Other domestic 
factors, such as cultural traditions, economic backwardness, an underdeveloped party 
system, weak administrative capacities, and divided leadership have affected the course 
of democracy development in Albania. In addition, internal political disputes and the 
recurrent focus on short-term political interests have created, during certain periods, an 
unfavorable environment for the achievement of necessary reforms. These internal 
factors have affected the speed of democratic reforms in the country. However, the 
democratization process in Albania “could have had a different trajectory without the 
presence of the EU pushing for and directing reforms.”283 
As noted previously, the prospect of EU membership was made clearer for 
Albania with the signing of a Stabilization and Association Agreement in June 2006. This 
was a turning point in the political discourse in Albania about undertaking radical 
reforms and staying committed to the democratic path. For many years, the governing 
elites in Albania, both in the government and the opposition, have declared that EU 
membership would be unambiguously beneficial. This is true. In contrast to NATO, “the 
EU offers not only a form of security but also, especially economic as well as political 
benefits to the states that join it.”284 When Albania becomes an EU member, many of the 
barriers to trade, investment, and the free movement of labor will disappear. Exchanges 
of knowledge, technology, and new ideas will become easier. Foreign competition will 
enhance business transparency, and access to the common market will improve the  
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attractiveness of Albania as a destination for foreign investment. Productivity of capital 
and labor will increase, and consumer goods will become cheaper, better in quality, and 
more diverse. 
Although public support for membership in the EU remains high at 88 percent,285 
important doubts persist concerning the perception of the integration process as whole. It 
is perceived as a decision to be taken in Brussels rather than an effort by Albania to carry 
out reforms and meet membership criteria. A survey by the Albanian Institute for 
International Studies indicates that “most respondents marked free movement into other 
EU countries as the most important benefit from EU membership.”286 Free movement is 
understood simply as the freedom to travel without visas, rather than in its broader sense 
as the free movement of labor, capital and businesses. Furthermore, there seems to be 
little awareness that free movement will not be of much use without economic 
development, democratization, and social well-being in Albania. It appears that, rather 
than achieving these goals, many Albanians are interested in leaving the country, and 
“integration into [the] EU seems to be perceived as a means to this end.”287 
Besides the benefits mentioned above, EU membership will require substantial 
budgetary outlays and large public sector investments in infrastructure, agriculture, the 
environment and other sectors, which will all significantly affect the performance of the 
economy. Additional costs and obligations will arise from the payment of contributions 
to the EU budget after Albania joins. Joining the EU will not occur without pain. 
Opening Albanian markets to tariff-free goods will no doubt introduce new competition 
and hurt domestic Albanian companies. Besides restructuring the economy in an 
increasingly competitive EU environment, the Albanian government may also have to 
adopt economic measures to finance EU law implementation.   
As with the other post-communist countries of central and Eastern Europe, the 
benefits of being inside the EU will outweigh the costs. Access to the large EU market 
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could help ensure the realization of economic growth rates that may over time close the 
existing GDP per capita gap between Albania and other EU members. Although joining 
the EU will entail significant costs in the short run, membership will, it is hoped, send a 
positive signal for more foreign investments, and strengthen Albania’s international 
position. However, significant challenges remain, including political and governmental 
stability, enforcing the rule of law, conducting elections in full compliance with 
international standards, developing civil society, fighting against corruption and 
organized crime, strengthening the public administration, and ensuring independence for 
the judiciary. 
NATO membership has been the most important achievement to date of post-
communist Albania, and a significant indication of the democratic development of the 
country. The Albanian political class should build on this accomplishment and continue 
to construct a stable democracy based on European standards, further consolidate 
democratic institutions, ensure economic growth, and attract more foreign investment. 
Democracy in Albania “will be judged more and more on its own merits than by way of 
comparison with the past.”288 This is why Albanian political elites should focus more on 
addressing the challenges of the future. This is the only way to shorten the path towards 
EU membership as the best guarantee of democratization and progress in Albania. 
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